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STEPHEN J. MORSE Neither Desert nor Disease
NEITHER DESERT NOR DISEASE
Stephen J. Morse*
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Why do we fear preventive detention and believe that it requires special
justification? Citizens in free, democratic societies are accustomed to sub-
stantial limitations on liberty that are justified morally and politically by the
“common good.” Avoiding serious danger is a greater good than most, but
the power of the state to confine dangerous people or to reduce danger by
equally oppressive intrusions is considered especially fearsome. The usual,
and generally uncontroversial, justifications given for such deprivations of
liberty are that the person has culpably committed a criminal offense or
that the agent is not responsible for the danger he or she presents. Criminal
imprisonment and various forms of civil commitment, for example, which
preempt potentially dangerous conduct by incapacitation, are considered
reasonable deprivations of liberty in such cases. But in neither case is the
state confining on purely preventive grounds a responsible agent who has
done no wrong. In contrast, pure preventive detention is an anathema, we
believe, because polities devoted to liberty and autonomy have no moral or
political warrant to confine or similarly oppress innocent, responsible
agents. What could justify such a vast intrusion on the liberty of such agents
to pursue their projects?1
Imagine, however, a three-time convicted armed robber who threatens,
completely believably, to commit a fourth crime. Or consider an extremely
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This article was originally presented at a conference, “The Ethics of Preemptive Action,”
sponsored by the Liberty Fund and the University of San Diego School of Law. I thank the
organizer, Larry Alexander, and the other conference participants for their helpful comments
and a stimulating meeting. A preliminary version of this article was first presented to an Ad
Hoc Workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank all my colleagues for their
useful suggestions. My thinking about preventive detention owes much to Michael Corrado,
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1. I recognize that the state has an uncontroversial right to quarantine innocent, responsi-
ble agents if such agents have communicable diseases and no less intrusive intervention will
prevent infection of others. Although many forms of communicable disease can be spread by
conduct, the justification of pure quarantine requires no action or potential action. It is a
purely public health measure directed toward microorganisms that has the undesirable effect
of limiting freedom of action. This  article addresses only the preemption of dangerous
conduct, which might in some cases include the transmission of disease. See generally Michael
Corrado, Punishment, Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (Summer/Fall
1996).
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angry and provoked person with an unblemished record who buys a gun
and threatens to harm the provoker. Or suppose there is an identifiable
group of responsible agents within a society for whom the statistical risk of
serious, future harmdoing is extremely high. All these cases seem to de-
mand some type of intervention to preempt virtually certain and serious
harm. In the legal world we now inhabit, however, neither civil commitment
or other forms of involuntary “treatment” nor criminal conviction in the
absence of at least attempted crime would be possible to prevent future
dangerous conduct. Moreover, these remedies often come too late to pre-
vent entirely predictable harms. And it is practically infeasible for state
agents adequately to monitor most potentially dangerous agents, even if
privacy concerns were obviated. Some form of genuinely preemptive action
would be the only intervention certain to prevent harm, but we now pur-
port to consider it an unjustifiable intrusion on liberty. Conversely, if no
citizen has a right unjustifiably to harm another and if the danger threat-
ened is sufficiently certain, why shouldn’t society have a right to intervene
in the lives of innocent, reponsible agents to prevent the harm? Why is pure
preventive or preemptive action wrong?
The thesis of this article is that society does have the right to inter-
vene, to impose pure preventive detention or equivalent deprivations,
when the risk of serious harm is grave. Part I considers the traditional
justifications for the civil and criminal law’s intrusions on the liberty of
dangerous people. It suggests that these justifications leave a gap in the
prevention of danger that only pure preventive detention can close. Part
II canvasses a wide array of legally authorized public and private preemp-
tive doctrines and practices that do not fully satisfy the usual desert or
disease justifications for preventive action, but that are also not purely
preemptive. I conclude from my examination of these doctrines and prac-
tices that our society already implicitly accepts substantial preventive ac-
tion and that many of the doctrines and practices contain substantial,
purely preemptive components, often unconvincingly justified by allegedly
traditional desert or disease rationales. The presence of covert pure pre-
vention demonstrates that the implicit need for it is powerful and that
pure prevention has an expandable salient in the law’s battle with po-
tential danger.
The third part of this article addresses whether explicit, pure preventive
detention would be a justifiable extension of the preemption now deemed
acceptable. I conclude that principles akin to those that underwrite indi-
vidual self-defense would justify limited pure preemption, but that applying
it justly faces perhaps insurmountable problems. Part IV provides a case
study of the futility of current preemptive doctrines and practices in a
situation fraught with obvious, grave peril. A very brief Conclusion reiter-
ates the claim that until predictive technology improves, explicit, pure
preventive  detention is a defective blunderbuss that will cause greater
harm than good.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION
FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION
Let us begin at the beginning. Human beings are injurious and all too often
lethal to themselves and others. Surely more people have been killed and
injured by the acts of others and themselves than by natural disasters. Only
toxic microbes are as dangerous as people. All civil societies, including the
least developed, therefore create numerous public and private socializing
institutions and practices to cabin the injurious propensities of their mem-
bers. But these practices and techniques are never foolproof: All fail some-
times, often disastrously. All societies therefore develop further practices
and institutions to respond to the failures and thus to reduce the further
risk of harm the failures create.
The basic logic of prevention is quite straightforward. To some unknown
degree, human beings must live in cooperative societies to survive. Such
societies are viable only if, also to some unknown degree, members forbear
from putting each other unreasonably at risk. Within the limits of viability,
how much risk is unreasonable is a normative, moral, and political question,
but all societies that survive surely place limits on risk and will act to prevent
danger from those for whom socialization has apparently failed. This story
can be told in the crudest evolutionary biological terms, but in more
politically and philosophically sophisticated societies, these necessary pre-
ventive practices are the subject of rich theoretical analysis, usually from a
consequential or a rights perspective. Broadly speaking, two types of stories,
each rooted in a theory of the person, inform these perspectives: “Good
bacteria, bad bacteria”; and “Taking people seriously.”
Let us begin with the short form of the former, abbreviated here because
it is rejected by all but the most extravagantly hard-nosed consequentialists.
According to this account, we could treat each other like bacteria. Some
bacteria that inhabit our gastrointestinal system, our gut, are crucial to the
smooth operation of the system. They are the good bacteria. We try to
enhance their survival and do nothing to inhibit their growth. On occasion,
alas, our guts are invaded by bacteria that interfere with the proper opera-
tion of the system, causing various unseemly ailments and, in extreme cases,
death. These are the bad bacteria. We try to prevent these critters from
entering our gut in sufficient numbers to overwhelm the body’s natural
defenses, and if the natural defenses fail, we try with various techniques,
such as antibiotics, to kill the offensive, bad bacteria.
Now, despite the potential of various bacteria to confer benefits and
harms, as the case may be, and despite our consequential, substantial efforts
to deal rationally with these bacteria, no one holds either kind of bacteria
responsible for smooth or rocky gastrointestinal functioning and we would
not dream of praising or blaming bacteria. Similarly, we would not dream
of considering antibiotic treatment a means of punishing the bad bacteria.
We treat bacteria purely as objects, and never as potentially responsible
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subjects, as potential moral agents. We could, by analogy, simply treat each
other like bacteria, as potentially beneficial or harmful objects, and act
accordingly. This conception of people, much beloved by eliminative mate-
rialists, would support a purely predictive and preventive scheme of social
organization, in which the emotional and societal response to the organism
could be entirely independent of the moral goodness or badness of the
person’s conduct. Indeed, any other regime may appear founded on irra-
tional dreams about our privileged place in the natural order.2 It would be
a regime of utterly strict liability. We do not at present have the emotional
repertoire or the predictive and therapeutic technology to institute this
vision very precisely or effectively, but this is a technoquibble. In principle,
I suppose, it is a possible form of social organization. Indeed, in some senses
we might all be “safer” and, to some, social life might appear more rational
if the show ran along these lines.
The alternative, dominant story, “Taking people seriously,” is familiar. It
admits that, like bacteria, human beings are part of the physical universe and
subject to the laws of that universe, but it also insists that, as far as we know,
we are the only creatures on earth capable of acting fully for reasons and
self-consciously. Only human beings are genuinely reason-responsive and
live in societies that are in part governed by behavior-guiding norms. We are
the only creatures to whom the questions “Why did you do that?” and “How
should we behave” are properly addressed, and only human beings hurt and
kill each other in response to the answers to such questions. As a conse-
quence of this view of ourselves, human beings typically have developed rich
sets of interpersonal, social attitudes, practices, and institutions, including
those that deal with the risk we present to each other. Among these are the
practice of holding others morally responsible, which includes moral expec-
tations, attitudes of praise and blame, and practices and institutions that
express those attitudes, such as reward and punishment.
The concern with justifying and protecting liberty is deeply rooted in the
conception of rational personhood I have sketched. Only human beings
self-consciously and intentionally decide how they should live; only human
beings have projects that are essential to living a good life. Only human
beings have expectations of each other and require justification for interfer-
ence in each other’s lives that will prevent the pursuit of projects and seeking
the good. If liberty is unjustifiably deprived, a good life is impossible.
Some would attempt to collapse the two accounts, claiming that many of
our seemingly retrospective, nonconsequential practices, such as holding
others responsible, can in fact be justified by a fully prospective, consequen-
tial theory.3 This account recognizes that evolution has designed us to be
intentional, self-conscious creatures, but practices like holding others re-
2. For a recent attempt to argue this point, see Edward O. Wilson, CONSILIENCE (1998).
3. See, e.g., Daniel Dennett, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING
153–72 (1984).
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sponsible are, allegedly, simply stimuli that increase the probability of safe
(good) behavior and decrease the probability of dangerous (bad) behavior.
No one, in other words, is “really” responsible. In the words of H.L.A Hart,
it is an “economy of threats.”4 The economy-of-threats approach does not
successfully explain our practices, however, and suffers from defects of its
own. Nothing in this approach would prohibit blaming and punishing
innocent people if doing so would maximize the good. This is a familiar
criticism, but one that has no answer if it is unjust to punish the innocent,
as virtually all theories of justice, except the most unflinchingly consequen-
tialist, hold.
Second, as Jay Wallace points out, the economy-of-threats approach fails
to explain our practices, because it omits the central attitudinal aspect of
blaming.5 To hold an agent responsible and to blame that agent is not
simply a behavioral disposition, whose purpose is the maximization of some
future good. Blaming fundamentally expresses retrospective disapproval.
Even if it has the good consequence of decreasing future harmdoing, our
current practice is undeniably focused in large measure on past events.6 In
sum, many of our most important moral and political concepts depend on
taking people seriously as people, as practical reasoners and potentially
moral agents.
The desire to be safe ultimately conflicts with and complements the
desire to be free. People who live in constant terror of dangerous neighbors
do not feel free or cannot enjoy their freedom, even if their society is
politically liberal. But achieving the safety that makes freedom possible
inevitably requires substantial infringement on the liberty of dangerous
agents. Because we take people seriously as people, however, we believe that
it is crucial to cabin the potentially broad power of the state to provide
protection by depriving people of liberty. Thus our polity has imposed two
fundamental legal limits on the state’s power to intervene: The agent must
be dangerous because he or she is suffering from a disease (especially a
mental disorder) or because the agent is a criminal.7
For people who are dangerous because they are disordered or because
they are too young to “know better,” the usual presumption in favor of
maximum liberty yields. Because the agent is not rational or not fully
rational, the person’s choice about how to live demands less respect, and
he or she is not morally responsible for his or her dangerousness. The
person can therefore be treated more “objectively,” like the rest of the
4. H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 43–44 (1968).
5. R. Jay Wallace, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 55–58 (1994).
6. Finally, the economy of threats approach makes the world entirely too “safe for determi-
nism.” The determinist anxieties that seem inevitably to arise cannot be banished so easily,
without doing violence to our conceptual concerns. A full, satisfying account of responsibility
and blaming, paradoxically, should be subject to anxieties about determinism.
7. I have explored the civil–criminal distinction as a basis for confinement elsewhere and
will therefore provide only the briefest sketch here. See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An
Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B. U. L. REV. 113, 116–22 (1996).
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world’s dangerous but nonresponsible instrumentalities, ranging from hur-
ricanes to microbes to wild beasts. In brief, agents incapable of rationality
do not actually have to cause harm to justify nonpunitive intervention. We
can take preemptive precautions, including broad preventive detention,
with nonresponsible agents based on an estimate of the risk they present.
Justified on consequential grounds, such deprivation will be acceptable if
the conditions of deprivation are both humane and no more stringent than
is necessary to reduce the risk of harm. Such deprivations are forms of
greater or lesser quarantine and may include “treatment,” but in theory
they are not punishment.8
Virtually all criminals are rational, responsible agents, however, and ac-
cording to the dominant story, the deprivation imposed on them, punish-
ment, is premised on considerations of desert. No agent should be
punished without desert for wrongdoing, which exists only if the agent
culpably caused or attempted prohibited harm. The threat of punishment
for a culpable violation of the criminal law is itself arguably a form of
preventive infringement on liberty, but it is an ordinary, “base-rate” in-
fringement that requires no special justification. In our society the punish-
ment for virtually all serious crimes, and thus for dangerous criminals, is
incapacitation, which is preventive during the term of imprisonment. But
criminals must actually have culpably caused or attempted harm to warrant
the intervention of punishment. We cannot detain them unless they de-
serve it and desert requires wrongdoing. In the interest of liberty, we leave
potentially dangerous people free to pursue their projects until they actu-
ally offend, even if their future wrongdoing is quite certain. Indeed, we are
willing to take great risks in the name of liberty.
In sum, both the criminal and the medical/psychological systems of
behavior control require a justification in addition to public safety—desert
for wrongdoing or nonresponsibility—to justify the extraordinary liberty
infringements that these systems impose. The story about crime and disease
is, of course, not so simple. Do we really believe that responsible, dangerous
agents have a right to be at liberty when their potential harmdoing is serious
and quite certain? In theory we do, and “gaps”9 between the disease and
crime justifications for intervention remain. But in fact, the law insistently
seeks to fill these gaps with both civil and criminal preemptive remedies.
Part II explores how uneasy we are about danger and how willing we are to
accept more purely preemptive preventive schemes.
8. The nonpunitive characterization of such interventions often justifies lesser procedural
protections for the potential subject. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 464 (1986) (Fifth
Amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination does not apply in a proceeding
to determine whether a person is a “sexually dangerous person” because the proceeding is not
“criminal”).
9. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
69, 90–94 (1996).
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II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PREEMPTION PRACTICES
This part canvasses a wide range of civil and criminal law doctrines and
practices that involve preemptive action to prevent dangerous conduct.
I suggest that, as a descriptive matter, our positive law already accepts
substantial forms of preemption that violate the usual, liberty-protecting
limits set by culpable criminality and disease. In all cases, it seems clear
that public safety is the impetus. Those laws and practices that seem most
problematic receive detailed consideration; more obvious examples are
treated briefly. I begin with two examples from the civil law that authorize
preventive confinement of apparently responsible agents and then turn
to a range of criminal law illustrations that permit extensive preemptive
action, often with a component of pure preemption, toward dangerous,
clearly responsible agents. Many of these examples invite “epistemic
skepticism”: Can we predict future danger with sufficient precision to war-
rant preemption? These doubts, which must be taken seriously, are ad-
dressed in  Part III,  but should be  remembered when considering  the
examples.
A. “Mentally Abnormal Sexually Violent Predator”
Commitments
Consider, first, the civil law response to a class of people, so-called mentally
abnormal sexual predators, who have committed no present crime and who
do not suffer from severe mental disorder, but who appear to be and often
are highly dangerous. Many states have recently adopted “sexually violent
predator” laws, which permit the “civil” commitment of those who meet the
criteria of mental abnormality and sexual dangerousness. I consider these
laws in detail because, despite appearances and argument to the contrary,
they create the potential for vast preventive detention unwarranted by the
usual justifications.
Leroy Hendricks, who had been convicted of numerous charges of mo-
lesting children throughout his adult life, starkly presented the “gap”
problem. Although Hendricks manifested a condition that most mental
health professionals consider a mental disorder, he was fully responsible
according to  even the most permissive cognitive standard for criminal
responsibility. Hendricks was firmly in touch with reality and knew the
difference between moral and legal right and wrong. According to a vo-
litional or control test for legal insanity, the issue is more problematic.
One sensible way of describing the phenomenology of Hendrick’s con-
dition is that it produced in him extremely strong desires or cravings to
have sexual contact with children, a desire that he experienced as com-
pelling, especially when he was under stress. Many people believe that
such cases qualify for a control excuse, but many others disagree. In any
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event, Hendricks was consistently found criminally responsible for his sex-
ual offenses. In other words, numerous judges or juries decided that he
deserved and could be fairly punished for those crimes, even to the extent
of 10 years’ incarceration for his last conviction for indecent liberties with
two 13-year-old boys.
For much the same reason concerning responsibility, Hendricks was not
civilly committable. Despite the vague language of the criteria for commit-
ment in most state statutes, for decades there has been widespread agree-
ment on theoretical and practical grounds that people with mental
disorders that might contribute to the potential for dangerous conduct are
not properly committable unless the mental disorder is quite severe and
renders them not responsible for themselves. Lawyers and mental health
professionals recognize that all mental disorders do not negate responsibil-
ity. Although Hendricks had a diagnosable mental disorder, it was not a
“major” mental disorder, it lacked psychotic features, and he was fully
capable of making rational decisions about his own treatment. In sum,
when Hendricks had completed the condign sentence for his latest offense,
he still presented a very real danger, but he deserved no further punish-
ment and he was a responsible agent who did not qualify for traditional
involuntary civil commitment.
It is paradoxical, to say the least, to claim that a sexually violent predator
is sufficiently responsible to deserve the stigma and punishment of criminal
incarceration, but that the predator is not sufficiently responsible to be
permitted the usual freedom from involuntary civil commitment that even
very predictably dangerous but responsible agents retain because we wish
to maximize the liberty and dignity of all citizens. Even if the standards for
responsibility in the two systems need not be symmetrical, it is difficult to
imagine what adequate conception of justice would justify blaming and
punishing an agent too irresponsible to be left at large. An agent responsi-
ble enough to warrant criminal punishment is sufficiently responsible to
avoid preventive detention. If a state seriously believes that any mental
disability sufficiently compromises responsibility to warrant civil preventive
detention, then such disability should surely be part of the criteria for the
insanity defense.
The Kansas mentally abnormal sexual predator statute nonetheless tried
to fill the gap between traditional criminal and civil confinement for peo-
ple like Hendricks who fit neither category. No one would deny that se-
rious sexual offenses would meet the usual civil commitment criterion of
“danger to others.” Moreover, unlike many standard civil committees, who
only threaten harms prior to commitment, sexual predators by definition
must be charged with or convicted of a sexual offense. Thus, there is
better evidence  that sexual predators, as Kansas and like states define
them, are in fact dangerous. The problem is the nonresponsibility justi-
fication. Employing criteria for mental abnormality, Kansas sought to
bring the statute within the allegedly nonpunitive, civil confinement para-
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digm by implying that sexual predators were not responsible for their
conduct.
In Kansas v. Hendricks10 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Kansas statute that provided for potentially lifelong
civil commitment  for people released from prison at the end of their
sentences who were mentally abnormal and presented a continuing threat
of sexually assaultive conduct. Although the Court’s reasoning suggested
that so-called sexually violent predators could not control themselves be-
cause they suffered from mental abnormalities, the Court’s reasoning was
singularly unpersuasive.11 Understanding that people like Hendricks can be
extremely dangerous if not confined makes it easy to understand why
Kansas grasped for a remedy, but not every problem has a solution that is
morally, theoretically, or empirically defensible. In this case, we have pur-
chased some public safety, but we have also threatened the precious civil
liberty of legally innocent, responsible people to be left largely alone. In
effect, Hendricks jettisons culpability and nonresponsibility as predicates for
confinement and declares open season on pure preventive detention with-
out admitting or perhaps even recognizing that it is doing this. To support
this assertion, let me turn to an analysis of the criteria for mental abnormal-
ity in Kansas that the Supreme Court approved.12
Now, in creating legal criteria, states are not bound by the conceptions
and definitions of any discipline. Nothing, for example, prevents a state
from defining “mental abnormality” differently from traditional psychiatric
or psychological definitions of mental disorder. And nothing in the abstract
prevents  a  state legislature from  finding that a  class  of citizens is not
responsible for specific conduct, even if mental health professionals or
ordinary citizens would disagree. Responsibility is a normative concept, and
we empower legislators, as our representatives, to create normative stand-
ards through legal rules. But rationally to command respect and allegiance,
such definitions and findings should comport with reasonable standards for
conceptual coherence and empirical understanding of behavior. My claim
is that the Kansas standard for “mental abnormality,” which was accepted
without critical analysis by the U.S. Supreme Court, falls far short of the
standard for rational support, suggesting that Kansas and a complicitous
Supreme Court filled the gap between criminal and civil confinement by a
legal sleight of hand.
The Kansas statute defines a sexually violent predator generally as “any
person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
10. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
11. See Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & LAW
250, 262–64 (1998).
12. The analysis of the Kansas  statute that follows shamelessly cannibalizes an earlier
analysis of the virtually identical Washington State statute. Morse, supra note 7, at 136–37.
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makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence.”13 A “mental abnormality” is defined as a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capac-
ity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of oth-
ers.14
These provisions together are vague and even incoherent definitions of
abnormally produced sexual danger. The former, which attempts to satisfy
the critical nonresponsibility criterion for justifiable civil commitment, sim-
ply requires that an abnormality must produce the potential sexual preda-
tion. The terms “personality disorder” and “mental  abnormality”  must
therefore do all the work. Personality disorder is a recognized diagnostic
category,15 but people with such disorders are seldom psychotic and rarely
can avoid responsibility for their deeds. This is not a promising predicate
for nonresponsibility without a great deal of conceptual reason to believe
that this recognized abnormality does sufficiently compromise responsibil-
ity. Mental abnormality is not a recognized diagnostic term, a point recog-
nized by friends and foes of sexual predator laws,16 but as mentioned, a
statutory term creates a legal criterion and need not precisely track terms
from other disciplines, such as psychiatry.17 The issue is whether the statu-
tory definition makes any rational sense on its own terms. If not, it should
not pass constitutional muster, even under the lax standards for rationality
the Supreme Court seems willing to approve when public safety is in ques-
tion.
The definition  states  that a person  is abnormal  if any biological or
environmental variable caused the person’s emotional or volitional capacity
to predispose the agent to engage in criminal sexual misconduct. But what
else would predispose anyone to any conduct, sexual or otherwise, if not
13. Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 59-29a02(a) (1994). This definition and the definition of “mental
abnormality” that follows in the text are almost exactly the same as the definitions that the state
of Washington adopted in its progenitor, sexual predator act. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. Secs.
71.09.020(1) & (2) (West Supp. 1995). The Washington act was found constitutional by the
Washington Supreme Court. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993). On federal appeal, the
United States District Court of the Western District of Washington found the act unconstitu-
tional as a violation of due process and of the prohibitions against ex post facto laws and double
jeopardy. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
14. Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 59-29a02(b) (1994).
15. American Psychiatric Association, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS (DSM-IV) 629–73 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
16. Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual
Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REY. 709, 730 (1992) (friend); John Q. La Fond, Washington’s
Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 755, 762–63 (1992) (foe).
17. Alexander Brooks cogently makes this point. See, id. at 730. Hendricks confirms it (at
2081). On the general “legal ambiguity” of the mental illness concept, see Bruce J. Winick,
Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & LAW 534
(1995).
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biological  and  environmental  variables  that affect  their emotional and
volitional capacities? In other words, the definition is simply a description
of the causation of any behavior. The content of abnormality in the defini-
tion is entirely dependent on the requirement of “sexually violent offenses.”
Nothing else in the definition differentiates the sexual predator from any
other person. All behavior, normal and abnormal alike, is the product of
congenital or acquired conditions affecting emotional or volitional predis-
positions. But if anyone who has a tendency to engage in sexual violence is
abnormal, then the term “mental abnormality” is circularly defined and
does no independent conceptual or causal work. Moreover, such a defini-
tion collapes all badness into madness. Finally, it is strange, if not incoher-
ent, to define an abnormality by reference to the penal code. If the penal
code becomes more forgiving, do the people who now satisfy the definition
become automatically “mentally normal?”18
Assuming, probably erroneously, that the law could cabin the seemingly
unconstrained reach of the vague term “mental abnormality,” why any
particular abnormality should excuse remains unexplained. Simply because
a mental abnormality may be causally related to other behavior does not
mean that the behavior should be excused.19 This is to confuse causation
and excuse. Causation, even by an “abnormal” variable, is not an excusing
condition. To believe otherwise is to commit what I have termed “the
fundamental psycholegal error.”20 Even if the potential predator suffers
from some causal abnormality, it does not necessarily follow that the poten-
tial predator is not responsible. The causal abnormality must produce a
genuine, independent excusing condition, such as irrationality, for a moral
or legal excuse to obtain.
What actual theory to hold potential predators nonresponsible might
be implicit, however? Irrationality is not a good candidate, because sexual
predators are firmly in touch with reality. One might try to claim that
their sexual desires are irrational, but no adequate theory exists to dis-
tinguish irrational from rational desires.21 Furthermore, the instrumental
rationality of sexual predators is entirely intact.22 They may have strange
or alarming desires, but they are perfectly capable of planning and exe-
18. In addition, the definition implies that some criminal sexual acts might not be a
“menace,” but if not, why are they criminalized?
19. Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1112–14 (1985)
(demonstrating that if causation were itself an excuse, then under a determinist theory, all
actions would be excused); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587,
1592–94 (1994) (refuting the “causal” theory of excuse and terming it the “fundamental
psycholegal error”) (1994); see also Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L. J. 527, 534–37
(1996) (explaining why abnormalities of the brain or nervous system that may play a causal
role in criminal conduct do not furnish independent ground for an excuse).
20. Morse, Culpability and Control, id. at 1592.
21. See Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality 139–40 (1993) (“At present, we have no
adequate theory of the substantive rationality of goals or desires. . . ”).
22. Even bizarre, serial sexual murderers—people far more dangerous than Leroy Hen-
dricks—are seldom psychotic, and carefully plan and execute the crimes that satisfy their
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cuting the means to fulfill them. It is possible that the strength of their
desires makes it  difficult  for sexual  offenders to  assess  the probability
that they will be caught, but this would not distinguish these offenders
from other impulsive offenders, and impulsivity does not warrant an ir-
rationality excuse.
We are thus left with some type of control theory of excuse. Indeed, this
was precisely the theory of nonresponsibility that the Supreme Court ac-
cepted as sufficient to justify the civil commitment of sexually violent preda-
tors generally. Commenting on criteria for civil commitment that depend
on a control theory, the Court wrote:
These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confine-
ment to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these
other civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerous-
ness, and then links that finding to the existence of a “mental abnormality”
or “personality disorder” that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the
person to control his dangerous behavior. . . . The precommitment require-
ment of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” is consistent with
the requirement of these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows
the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control
their conduct.23
At least eight justices subscribed to this part of the Court’s opinion, which
implicitly assumes that Kansas (and other states) understand and can reli-
ably and validly assess when an agent is “unable to control” intentional action.
But what good reason is there to believe that volitional problems are well
understood and that sexually violent predators specially lack the ability to
control their sexual conduct? So-called volitional or control problems are
generally and notoriously difficult conceptually to define and practically to
apply. Just such difficulties led both the American Bar Association and the
American Psychiatric Association to recommend the abolition of a control
test for legal insanity during the wave of insanity defense “reform” ferment
that followed John W. Hinckley, Jr.’s successful insanity defense.24 Moreover,
what is there about sexual desires that make them more “compelling” than
other equally strong desires, such as the greed that may result in property
fantasies. Janet Warren et al., The Sexually Sadistic Serial Killer 14, 19 (1995) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author) (reviewing the literature and analyzing 20 cases of sexually
sadistic serial killers selected from files obtained by the National Center of the Analysis of
Violent Crime of the FBI); see Ronet Bachman et al., The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing
a Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343 (1992) (finding
in a study of conditions that would affect the likelihood of committing sexual assault that both
perceived risk of formal sanction and moral evaluation of the act had a significant restraining
effect).
23. Hendricks, supra note 10, at 2080 [emphasis added].
24. American Bar Association, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 330,
339–42 (1984); American Psychiatric Association, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 11
(1982).
276 STEPHEN J. MORSE
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 10 Sep 2013 IP address: 130.91.146.35
crime?25 Why isn’t the “Moneyphile”26 as out of control as the person
suffering from, say, “sexual sadism,” a so-called paraphilia included in the
DSM-IV,27 which would surely satisfy Kansas’s abnormality requirement?
Hendricks reported that when he was stressed he could not control his
urges. Similarly, people who are dependent on substances and use them to
control “stress” report that they feel strong cravings. I believe that all these
people are honestly reporting how they feel subjectively, but these feelings
are no substitute for a conceptual or empirical demonstration that they are
in fact out of control or that we can reliably and validly measure control
problems.
In sum, neither Kansas nor the Supreme Court provided either empirical
or conceptual reason to believe that “mentally abnormal sexually violent
predators” could not control themselves. There was only assertion on this
point and little empirical or conceptual reason to accept it. Indeed, the
Court was countenancing civil commitment based on a finding of nonre-
sponsibility for people who had been found fully criminally responsible and
justly punished for precisely the same behavior that now allegedly war-
ranted commitment. In my view Hendricks is a transparent attempt to fill the
gap with a make-weight justification that seeks to bring the Kansas scheme
within the confines of traditional civil commitment.
Most important because most threatening to civil liberty, the Kansas
scheme could be expanded without difficulty to authorize the preventive
detention of classes of potentially dangerous people vastly broader than the
sexually violent individuals the Hendricks statute covered. All people con-
victed of crime are potentially civilly committable according to Hendricks’
logic. In Samuel Butler’s nineteenth-century novel Erewhon, criminals were
treated as sick and hospitalized. This “medicalized” conception of criminal
behavior has also had a great purchase on the imagination of many alleg-
edly scientific thinkers of the post–World War II era, who sought to elide
the distinction between mad and bad. At various times, criminal behavior
has been seen as the “symptom” of pathological psychodynamics or sociody-
namics; current scholars and others inclined to the elision are more likely
to view it as a symptom of a faulty brain or faulty nervous system. For these
people, punishment is a crime, because it is unjustified by the desert of the
criminal, who is, after all, just “sick.” What is worse, punishment is useless
because it does not cure the patient and return him or her to a productive
role in society. Criminals need to be treated according to this conception,
and potential criminals need to be detained preventively for their own good
and for ours. This is the vision, I fear, that Hendricks permits.
25. An interesting question about sexual disorders or other “disorders of desire” is whether
the “condition” is a mental disorder independent of the “symptomatic” “abnormal” desire or
whether the abnormal desires are themselves the abnormal condition, but let us hold this
question open.
26. My term.
27. See supra note 15, at 530.
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Hendricks’ holding means that a state legislature is free within the widest
limits to define mental abnormality as it wishes and to find that mentally
abnormal people so defined are unable to control specific conduct. The
problem the case presents is that the definition of “mental abnormality” the
Supreme Court found acceptable cannot be logically limited to sexually
violent predators. As I demonstrated above, the definition is so broad that
it in fact can be applied to any behavior. All behavior is produced by
congenital and acquired emotional and volitional predispositions, and the
abnormality could be any antisocial or deviant conduct “in a degree consti-
tuting a menace to the health or safety of others.” Interpreted narrowly, any
crime against the person would constitute a menace to health or safety;
interpreted broadly, any crime at all could constitute such a menace. In
Jones,28 for example, the Supreme Court was untroubled by the spectre that
relatively minor property crime was used as the predicate for the danger-
ousness component of commitment after an insanity acquittal.
Nothing, therefore, would seem constitutionally to bar a state from defin-
ing a class of “mentally abnormal violent predators,” or more broadly,
“mentally abnormal dangerous predators,” and from providing for involun-
tary commitment of the class at the end of a prison term or if the alleged
predator was incompetent to stand trial. The expanded definition of “men-
tal abnormality” would be this:
a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit violent [dangerous] of-
fenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health or safety
of others.
As long as this “condition” “makes the person likely to engage in violent
[dangerous] acts,” the new criterion is a perfect analogue to the Kansas
sexually violent predator provisions. And if the legislative history or act’s
preamble contained language indicating that the state found that such
mentally abnormal violent [dangerous] people could not control them-
selves and presented a special threat to public safety, the analogous consti-
tutional justification would be complete. Moreover, if the state found that
these “violent predators” were, alas, untreatable, the failure of the state to
provide anything more than pure incapacitation would not compromise the
allegedly nonpunitive character of the commitment.
Finally, as Youngberg v. Romeo makes clear, even if one purpose of the
commitment is treatment and “violent predatory predisposition” is treat-
able, the state need not provide more than “professional judgment” deems
minimally necessary.29 In sum, the pure behavioral quarantine of poten-
28. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, n.14 at 365 (1983).
29. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1982). Youngberg further held that if
budgetary constraints prevented professionals from providing what they deemed minimally
necessary, the professionals would have a good-faith immunity bar to liability. Id. at 323.
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tially violent predators, as if they were wild beasts, would be justified, and
little effective treatment would be provided, even if it were available.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court has provided constitutional warrant for
extensive  commitment  of apparently responsible agents. Its attempt to
justify mentally abnormal sexual predator laws by a nonresponsibility as-
sumption failed, and wide-ranging pure preventive detention can now be
instituted with only the clumsiest legislative sleight-of-hand.
B. Post-Insanity Acquittal Commitment
In all states, a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity may be
committed to a state hospital because there is a presumption that the
acquittee remains mentally disordered, and as a result, not responsible
and dangerous. In Foucha v. Louisiana30 the Supreme Court considered
whether a state could continue to confine an insanity acquittee in a hos-
pital if the inmate continued to present a risk of violent conduct, but
was no longer suffering from a serious mental disorder. Further confine-
ment based on desert was impermissible because Foucha had been found
nonculpable for the previous conduct that occasioned the present com-
mitment. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held the commit-
ment unconstitutional on the ground that mental disorder was a necessary
criterion  for  the continued commitment in hospital of  a currently re-
sponsible person who had not been convicted of crime. In short, civil
commitment of a person who had committed dangerous acts in the past
and was likely to do so in the future was nonetheless unconstitutional if
the person was both innocent and responsible. The Court thus upheld
the traditional civil–criminal distinction, but the justices were closely di-
vided—indeed, four were untroubled by the pure preventive detention
of continued confinement.
Furthermore, in an extraordinarily cryptic portion of her concurrence,
Justice O’ Connor suggested that the state might continue to confine a
person like Foucha if the commitment scheme were more narrowly
drawn.31 Justice O’ Connor seemed willing to uphold the civil commitment
of at least some dangerous people who had been acquitted by reason of
insanity for committing dangerous acts in the past and were still dangerous,
even if these people were now also fully responsible. It is not clear from the
O’Connor concurrence if she would require some finding of mental abnor-
mality, as did the statute upheld in Hendricks, to make the commitment
analogous to traditional civil commitment. If not, however, then five justices
of the Supreme Court would be willing to countenance pure preventive
detention, at least of a person who had committed a crime without being
responsible and who continued to be dangerous.
30. 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
31. Id. at 87–88.
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Legislatures and lower courts have accepted Justice O’Connor’s implicit
invitation to adopt a “narrow” Foucha exception. For example, in State v.
Randall,32 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the continuing confine-
ment of an insanity acquittee who was no longer suffering from a mental
disorder. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that due process was satisfied
if the acquittee was dangerous, if there was a “medical justification” to
continue the confinement, and if the commitment did not exceed the
maximum term of imprisonment permitted for the crime charged.33 Nei-
ther physical nor serious mental disorder was present, so the only “medical
justification” must be that there was a “treatment” available to “cure” the
“patient” of the “medical abnormality” of being dangerous. But unless
mental disorder caused the agent to be dangerous because it gave the agent
crazy reasons to harm others, the agent is entirely responsible for being
dangerous and is indistinguishable from any other person with a history of
violence and a continuing propensity to commit crimes. There may in fact
be interventions applied to individual agents that can reduce violent pro-
pensities, but they ordinarily cannot be involuntarily applied in locked
institutions to legally innocent and responsible people. Moreover, there is
no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the potential for violence of people
who had previously been crazily dangerous is more treatable than the
potential for violence of people generally.
The “medical justification” criterion is a transparent and fraudulent at-
tempt to bring this type of commitment within the disease justification for
preemptive confinement. The limitation on the term of the commitment
to the  maximum  term for the  crime  charged is simply a  salve to  the
legislative conscience and a signal that the continued commitment is puni-
tive. Using the prison sentence possible for the crime charged as a limit on
the commitment term makes little sense. As the United States Supreme
Court recognized in Jones v. United States,34 the rational limit to a medically
justified commitment should be set by treatment and danger considera-
tions, not by considerations of proportionate desert. The defendant was not
responsible, so desert is entirely inapt. And if amenability to treatment and
potential danger are the justifications for the commitment, then the agent
should be released only whenever treatment succeeds or danger is reduced
for any reason.
The progeny of Foucha, such as Randall, suggest that pure preventive
detention of insanity acquittees is potentially constitutional, requiring again
only the incantation of a “medical” formula to ensure its constitutional
credentials. What is more, the logic of Randall, like the logic of Hendricks,
would permit much broader intervention than for the limited class of
insanity acquittees. If continued confinement of now-responsible insanity
acquittees—a massive deprivation of liberty—is justifiable, then perhaps the
32. 532 N.W.2d 94 (Wis. 1995).
33. Id. at 106–10.
34. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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involuntary but “medically justified” “treatment” of all dangerous, incarcer-
ated criminals—an arguably lesser deprivation—would also be justified.
Finally, if “medically justified” confinement, severed from desert, is ac-
ceptable for responsible, dangerous agents, why should it matter that the
agent was acquitted by reason of insanity? Why would not dangerousness
and “medical justification” warrant commitment generally? Indeed, this is
precisely the potential scenario that Hendricks implies. Randall and like cases
simply confirm the possibility.
C. Pre-Trial Detention of Dangerous Defendants
The most obvious and straightforward criminal law example of preventive
detention of dangerous and responsible agents is the pre-trial detention
without bail of potentially dangerous charged defendants. In United States v.
Salerno35 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this prac-
tice because such detention is limited in substantial ways. Most important,
there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime
charged, and the length of the commitment is limited by the constitutional
requirement that criminal defendants must receive speedy trials. Still, the
guarantee of a speedy trial does not prohibit intervals of months, and
occasionally longer, between arrest and trial, so denial of bail can cause
substantial, if not unlimited, incarceration.
Although Salerno in fact accepts pure preventive detention—the defen-
dant may have been properly charged, but until he or she is convicted the
person is presumed innocent—it is arguably only a minimal and impeccably
rational gap-filler. The legal presumption of innocence in criminal law is a
normative doctrine that allocates the risk of error almost totally to the state
when liberty and criminal stigma are at stake,36 but this admirable legal
presumption is quite distinct from the relatively uncontroversial assump-
tion that the vast majority of charged defendants are factually guilty. Thus,
when such people threaten grave danger if left at liberty until trial and if
the term  of preventive  confinement  seems  minimal, denial of  bail on
grounds of potential danger seems defensible. Once again, limited pure
prevention is permissible.
D. Legislative “Redefinition” of the Elements of Crime
The U.S. Supreme Court has explicity and implicitly granted states the
authority to redefine the mental-state elements of crimes to ensure that
35. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
36. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause
requires the state to prove every element of the crime charged “beyond a reasonable doubt”
to “provide concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic
and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law’”).
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some dangerous defendants receive longer prison sentences than they in
fact deserve. For example, in Montana v. Egelhoff,37 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a Montana statute that prohibited a
criminal defendant from using evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate
the subjective mental states that the definitions of most crimes include.38
James Allen Egelhoff shot two victims in the back of the head after spending
all day drinking with them. He was charged with deliberate homicide, which
Montana defined as subjectively “purposely or knowingly” causing the death
of another human being.39 Egelhoff claimed that he lacked these mental
states because he had been in a state of alcohol-induced black-out.40 Pursu-
ant to the Montana intoxication statute, however, the trial court instructed
the jury that it could not consider Egelhoff’s intoxication in determining
whether he purposely or knowingly killed the victims. Egelhoff appealed on
the ground that the statute violated due process because it prevented the
jury from considering relevant evidence and thus relieved the state from
proving all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although the Montana Supreme Court accepted Egelhoff’s claim, the
U.S. Supreme Court approved the Montana statute on historical and con-
sequential grounds. The Court claimed that such rules were traditional;
moreover, the statute served the purpose of protecting the public from the
criminogenic properties of drink. The Court noted briefly in passing the
argument that a voluntary drinker is responsible for all the consequences
of the impaired faculties that ensue.
But if Egelhoff was unconscious, is he as guilty as if he had killed pur-
posely or knowingly? If he killed when he was genuinely in a state of
alcohol-induced “unconsciousness,” he did not actually kill purposely or
knowingly, as Montana law defines these mens reas. Perhaps he killed reck-
lessly if he was consciously aware before or during his drinking binge that
there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he would become homi-
cidal if he drank to the stage of unconsciousness. Or perhaps he was not
aware that his drinking created this risk, but he should have known that this
risk existed. If so, he is guilty of killing negligently. But if Egelhoff did not
kill purposely or knowingly—a factual issue usually left fully to the
jury—then according to standard principles of culpability and desert, he
does not deserve to be punished for killing with one of these two particu-
larly heinous mental states. If Egelhoff’s claim about unconsciousness was
true, however, he has demonstrated that he is capable of multiple homicide
when drunk and that he is undoubtedly a dangerous agent. Nevertheless,
he is not guilty of purposely or knowingly killing his victims, and the greater
37. 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
38. Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 45-2-203 (1995).
39. Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 45-5-102 (1995).
40. Indeed, a few hours after the shooting and more than an hour after being taken custody,
Egelhoff’s blood alcohol content was 0.36.
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punishment for these crimes that the Montana intoxication statute permits
is a form of preventive detention justified solely by dangerousness.
The counterargument, briefly noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, is that
Egelhoff was responsible for becoming drunk and therefore he should be
held fully responsible for the consequences of his drunken conduct. Mon-
tana’s statute, which prohibits defendants from using evidence of voluntary
intoxication to rebut an allegation that a crime was committed with a
required, subjective mens rea, expresses moral condemnation of behaving
badly when drunk. Aristotle, for example, thought that a person who did
harm when drunk was undoubtedly culpable.41 But getting drunk is one
wrong, and whatever else an agent does while drunk is another. With few
and highly controversial exceptions,42 the common law does not allow the
mens rea for one crime to substitute for the mens rea required for a second
crime.
Consider further the Model Penal Code’s rule on this issue, which tries
to have it both ways about intoxication.43 While rejecting strict liability
generally, the Code provides that a voluntarily intoxicated defendant may
use evidence of such intoxication to negate purpose and knowledge, but
not to negate recklessness. The Code thus equates the culpability for be-
coming drunk with the conscious awareness of anything criminal that the
agent might do while drunk. This “equation” permits the state to meets its
burden of persuasion concerning recklessness without actually proving that
the defendant was ever actually aware that getting drunk created a grave risk
that the defendant would then commit the specific harm the statute pro-
hibited.
As an empirical matter, however, this equation is often preposterous. An
agent will not be consciously aware while becoming drunk that there is a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that he or she will commit a particular
crime when drunk, unless the person has a prior history of committing this
specific crime while unconscious from drink. If such a prior history or other
circumstance indicating prior conscious awareness exists, then the prosecu-
tion is capable of proving and should be required to prove the existence of
prior awareness. The prosecution should not be able to rely on what is in
effect the conclusive presumption that becoming drunk demonstrates the
same culpability as the actual conscious awareness of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the defendant would commit the specific harm.
The Montana statute goes even further toward strict liability than does
the Model Penal Code, of course, by providing that a defendant cannot use
evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate purpose or knowledge. One
interpretation of the statute—rejected by Montana’s own Supreme Court,
but adopted by Justice Ginsburg—is that the intoxication provision simply
41. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. III, ch. 5, 27–29.
42. Felony-murder and certain extensive doctrines of accomplice liability are the prime
examples.
43. Model Penal Code, Sec. 2.08(2) (Official Draft 1962).
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works to redefine the mental-state element for murder to include an objec-
tive mens rea—negligence. Ever since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pat-
terson v. New York,44 it has been clear that the states have the federal
constitutional authority to effect such a redefinition, but this was not Mon-
tana’s interpretation of its own law.45 More important for my analysis, this
redefinition undermines the standard view that culpability is hierarchically
arrayed depending on the blameworthiness of the various mental states.46
We simply do not believe, and with good reason, that negligent harmdoing
is as blameworthy as committing the same harm purposely or with conscious
awareness. The latter mental states indicate that the agent is consciously
lacking in concern for the interests and well-being of an identifiable victim
or class of victims, an attitude toward moral obligations that is more blame-
worthy than lack of awareness. Few except Justice Holmes believe that
objective and subjective blameworthiness ought to be equated.47 Charac-
terizing a negligent killer as a murderer does violence to our ordinary
notions of culpability and desert.48
Egelhoff was a dangerous agent, and it is undeniable that the state might
have had great difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
legally conscious and thus guilty of purposely or knowingly killing. Without
the crutch of strict liability, the state might have been able to convict him
only for negligent homicide, typically graded as involuntary manslaughter,
which carries a substantially shorter term of years than does murder. To
avoid this result, to ensure that people like Egelhoff are preventively de-
44. 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (permitting New York to place on the defendant the burden of
persuasion on the issue of “extreme emotional disturbance,” New York’s analogue to the
provocation/passion doctrine, which traditionally reduces murder to manslaughter, and per-
mitting the state largely to define as it wishes the elements of crime that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt).
45. Montana could, if it wished, have defined the mens rea for murder as negligence without
constitutional hindrance. But such a definition would have been a similar abandonment of
culpability and objectionable for precisely the same reasons I criticize the Egelhoff opinion.
46. See Douglas Husak, The Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability, 1 LEGAL THEORY 493
(1995) (defending a qualified version of the claim that culpability is hierarchically arrayed
depending on the relative blameworthiness of particular mental states).
47. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 49–51 (1881; Dover ed., 1991).
48. With these observations in mind, consider Egelhoff’s culpability again. First, let us
assume that as the result of voluntary intoxication, James Allen Egelhoff was actually in a
mental state that would meet the law’s requirement of “unconsciousness” when he killed. It is
not unthinkable morally to condemn drinking oneself purposely or recklessly into a state of
unconsciousness, but this behavior is not a crime per se. Criminal law theorists dispute the basis
for the exculpatory effect of unconsciousness, but all agree that it does exculpate. So, if we
believe Egelhoff’s claim that he was legally unconscious, or to put it more accurately, if the
prosecution were unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was legally conscious,
then Egelhoff is not guilty of purposely or knowingly killing. Moreover, there is no evidence
that Egelhoff was consciously aware when he was drinking that he would become homicidal
when drunk. Thus, he did not kill recklessly, even if we look back to his earlier mental states
to find culpability. Once again, Egelhoff might be fully responsible for becoming unconscious,
but it is a form of strict liability to hold him fully accountable for anything he did while
unconscious without proof of the mental states usually required. He culpably caused the
condition that would negate the prima facie case, but not with purpose, knowledge or reckless-
ness that he would be exculpated.
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tained for longer than their culpability warrants, the Montana statute, with
constitutional blessing, permits undeserved criminal incarceration.
States are thus quite free to redefine the elements of crimes in nontradi-
tional ways to permit conviction of more serious crimes and hence longer
incarceration than is justified by the defendant’s desert. The implications
of  this for preventive  detention  generally are enormous. Consider the
following hypothetical scheme for homicide liability. Suppose a state de-
fined “criminal homicide” as “intentionally engaging in conduct that causes
the death of another human being.” Then, the state might permit affirm-
ative defenses that would permit conviction of lesser degrees of homicide
liability if the defendant could prove the “mitigating” circumstances that she
did not kill purposely, or recklessly, or negligently. After all, Patterson teaches
that states can shift the burden of persuasion on mitigating affirmative
defenses to the defendant. In such a case, the defendant would be fully
exonerated only if she were able to prove that she killed with no culpable
mental state whatsoever. In such a regime, there would be great risk of
defendants being convicted of crimes that could not be proven if the state
bore the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on all fundamen-
tal mens rea elements. If such a statute would be constitutional—and I fear
that it might be—a powerful engine for generating preventive detention
would be created. Many dangerous defendants would do more time than
they deserve.
E. “Preventive Detection”
“Preventive detection”49 in criminal law includes various types of “sting” and
other undercover operations. In these instances, law enforcement believes
that the targets are engaged in unlawful activity or are predisposed to do so
and are simply looking for the opportunity, but no arrest is yet justified
because the police do not have probable cause to believe that the target has
committed a crime. Law enforcement simply believes, often on good evi-
dence that is nonetheless insufficient for probable cause, that the targets
are “criminal elements.” By various strategems, law enforcement’s goal is to
entice the target unwittingly to provide evidence that confirms the police
belief. In the case of many so-called consensual or victimless crimes, such as
bribery, receiving stolen goods, drug selling, and prostitution, the com-
pleted crime  will produce no complaining  victim, so  law  enforcement
allegedly must resort to undercover tactics to enforce these laws. The ethics
of various aspects of such operations have been hotly debated,50 but the
need for these operations is widely assumed, and the legality of the practice
in general is clear. Even if a target has no prior record of any type, a sting
49. I owe this creative phrase to Professor Robert Blecker.
50. See especially, Gary T. Marx, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 89–107
(1988).
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that produces criminal wrongdoing will support a conviction unless the
defense of entrapment obtains and the governing law of entrapment sup-
ports the conclusion that sting behavior is lawful preemption.
The majority entrapment rule is the so-called subjective test, which pro-
vides a defense only if the defendant was not predisposed to commit the
crime. The focus of this test is on the defendant’s culpability. If the defen-
dant was ready, willing, and able to commit the crime—that is, unless law
enforcement was completely responsible for creating the criminal predispo-
sition—the defendant will be found culpable, even if the police conduct was
morally offensive. In one sense, this rule makes a great deal of sense. After
all, causation is not itself an excuse.51 If the defendant commits the prohib-
ited act with the requisite mens rea and without any other excuse, why should
the nature of any “but for” cause for the criminal behavior affect the
defendant’s culpability, whether the cause is police conduct or anything
else? For example, why should it matter if the “buyer” who buys illegal drugs
from a ready, willing, and able seller is an actual buyer or an undercover
cop? The defendant’s culpability is the same in both cases.
Notice in such cases, however, that the target may have a criminal disposi-
tion, but having such a disposition is not a crime in itself. Although the defen-
dant may have been predisposed and ultimately culpable for the crime, the
expression of the predisposition by that criminal behavior was the product of
police conduct. The target was innocent of wrongdoing until the police in-
tervened. Law enforcement is essentially preempting criminal behavior with
innocent victims or under “uncontrolled” conditions by causing it to occur
with police officers, under “controlled,” generally less dangerous conditions.
The minority, “objective” entrapment test produces rather more mixed
but still powerful evidence that sting operations are preemptive. This test
focuses on the nature of the police activity, rather than on the defendant’s
culpability. The goal is to deter outrageous police misconduct. If the police
activity was so enticing that it would have created criminal predisposition in
an average and otherwise innocent person, then the defense of entrapment
will obtain, whether or not a particular defendant was predisposed. In
either case the defendant is once again legally innocent until the law
enforcement intervened; indeed, the citizen without predisposition lacks
any culpability whatsoever toward this criminal conduct. But even in cases
in which the defendant was predisposed, the minority rule would not allow
as much preemption because the conduct still must be sufficient to entice
an unpredisposed, innocent agent.
The minority rule’s focus on outrageously preemptive law enforcement
seems to suggest substantive limits to preemption, but the rule is somewhat
perplexing. After all, even outrageously enticing police conduct constitutes
an offer, rather than a threat. Offers increase freedom and are not coercive,
so it is difficult to understand why the “outrageously enticed” defendant
51. Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, supra note 19, at 531–34 (1996).
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should have a defense. Genuinely blameless individuals do not engage in
criminal conduct, even when the positive incentives are profound. Indeed,
it is no defense if a private citizen uses precisely the same tactics that would
support an entrapment defense under the minority rule if they had been
employed by law enforcement. Moreover, the minority rule offers no en-
trapment defense to the most serious forms of criminal conduct that most
typically motivate the desire for preemptive action. When less serious crime
is at stake and the police activity is sufficiently unseemly, the minority rule
does set a limit on preemptive police conduct, but the limitation is itself
limited. The minority entrapment rule permits substantial preemption.
F. Inchoate Crime
Inchoate crime laws—solicitation, conspiracy, and many cases of at-
tempt—purport to respond to culpable criminal behavior, but I suggest that
they incorporate a significant amount of pure preemption. I recognize that
this suggestion is controversial, but in many cases of inchoate criminality, I
believe, a clear showing of sufficient desert is absent, but we are willing
implicitly to punish because the inchoate criminal is dangerous. Inchoate
crimes are designed substantially to fill gaps, rather than to respond to fault.
According to the usual story, we do not lock people up for bad thoughts
and intentions; we lock them up only for bad deeds done intentionally.
With the exception of attempts in which the agent has done the “last act,”
all cases of inchoate crime involve situations in which the agent’s behavior
is preliminary, often very much so, and often not objectively or manifestly
dangerous.52 We are willing to punish such agents because we believe that
their preliminary conduct is sufficient evidence that they really do intend
to commit or to aid the commission of the object crime.53 If we really
believed that inchoate criminals would go no further than “mere” prepara-
tory conduct or further than simply agreeing to commit crimes, for exam-
ple, we would surely not criminalize many attempts or conspiracy. Indeed,
punishment of both attempt and the completed crime and solicitation and
the object crime is prohibited. The U.S. Constitution permits the punish-
ment of both conspiracy and the object crime,54 but this practice is ques-
tionable and justified solely by the “group danger” rationale, rather than by
the truly independent criminality of agreement.55
52. See George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 141 (1978).
53. I recognize that conspiracy requires neither perpetration nor necessary accomplice
liability in non-Pinkerton jurisdictions, but I believe that the characterization in the text still
holds. If they do commit the object crime, most conspirators will in fact be either perpetrators
or accomplices. And conspirators whose behavior would not meet the criteria for perpetration
or accomplice liability will typically be considered conspirators in the first place solely because
American conspiracy law foolishly permits extravagant boundaries for the scope of conspira-
cies.
54. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 640 (1961).
55. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to Sec. 5.03, at 390 (1985).
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Until a defendant commits the last act, we can never be certain that the
potential miscreant will express bad thoughts and intentions by bad action.
The state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an inchoate criminal
agreed to commit the object crime, asked another to commit it, or came
close to committing it with the purpose that it be committed. In such cases
it may be vastly likely that the inchoate criminal is really “on the job.”
Indeed, the closer the potential criminal comes to committing a nefarious
deed, the more confident we can be about the prediction that he or she
will commit the crime. But whether one will really do it is in doubt until
the last act is accomplished. There is an argument that pre-last act attempts
deserve  punishment because they produce  social  anxiety, but most  at-
tempts probably do no such thing, and the harm of “social anxiety” is not
a sufficiently independent ground for punishing attempts. In sum, except
for the criminalization of “last-act” cases, inchoate criminality is largely
preemptive, rather than a response to behavior that itself risks harming
others.
The affirmative defense of abandonment or renunciation, which is appli-
cable only to inchoate crime, is further evidence that criminalizing such
conduct is a preemptive response to potential danger rather than a retribu-
tive response to past wrongdoing. Although the defendant may have satis-
fied all the elements of conspiracy, solicitation, or attempt and would be
entirely guilty if seized at the moment the elements were first satisfied, in
brief, the defense obtains if the defendant completely abandons or re-
nounces the intention to achieve the criminal objective and acts to prevent
the criminal objective from occurring.56 The abandonment or renunciation
must not be motivated by fear of detection, by circumstances that increase
the difficulty of achieving the objective, or by the desire simply to postpone
the crime until a later time. Another, significant exception is that the
defense does not apply if an attempt defendant has completed the last act,
even if there is genuine remorse and a total change of heart at that mo-
ment.
Abandonment is an anomalous defense because the criminal who is
prima facie guilty of inchoate crime has satisfied the elements of the crime
and acted without justification or excuse. Abandonment itself neither justi-
fies nor excuses inchoate criminal behavior because the defendant’s act and
mental state satisfy the elements of the crime and the defendant has acted
unjustifiably. The inchoate crime is “complete.” Nonetheless, we let the
criminal “take it back,” which is not permitted with any other crime or class
of crimes, even if the completed, prohibited harm can be entirely reme-
died.
For example, if an agent takes and carries away the property of another
with the intent permanently to deprive the owner of the property, but then
the agent renounces her criminal intention and returns the property before
56. See, e.g., Model Penal Code Sec. 5.01(4).
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the owner discovers the loss, the agent is guilty of larceny and has no
defense. Only prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute or jury nullification
could prevent conviction. If an agent intentionally destroys the fungible
property of another, but then renounces her criminal intention and re-
places the destroyed property with identical property, she will be guilty of
the malicious destruction of property, even if the owner never knew the
original was destroyed. In these cases, like cases of abandoned inchoate
crime, no substantial, objective harm may be done and we may sometimes
be quite sure that the agent will never offend again, but the defense obtains
only in cases of inchoate crime.
Various justifications can explain the affirmative defense of abandon-
ment. Inchoate crimes do not produce a prohibited harm and results
matter, it might be claimed, but the examples in the last paragraph above
and the exception for failed “last-act” attempts indicate that the absence
of harm does not itself justify the defense. The defense gives the genuine
renouncer an incentive to renounce, but the person who genuinely re-
nounces presumably least needs the incentive. Moreover, if we want to
provide incentives to avoid producing harms, why shouldn’t we permit a
defense if  genuine  remorse alone causes  any criminal  intentionally to
“cure” any crime? I am not denying that results or incentives play a role
in the justification of abandonment, but it seems clear that we permit
the defense in large measure because we believe that abandonment dem-
onstrates that the criminal wasn’t yet “really” a criminal, wasn’t really “on
the job.” When the agent previously formed the intention to commit the
object crime and acted on that  intention sufficiently to satisfy the act
element of inchoate criminality, somehow the criminal really didn’t fully
mean it. We permit active abandonment because until the last act, there
is always a genuine chance that the inchoate criminal does not “really”
mean it.
Failed last-act cases and completed crime cases with “cure,” even if there
is genuine remorse in both cases, demonstrate that the agent has intention-
ally done all the conduct necessary to produce the objective, prohibited
harm. In contrast, all other inchoate crimes may always be cases simply of
bad intentions. Now, bad intentions with substantial preliminary conduct
may be good indicators that criminal deeds will follow, but there is no
guarantee. We allow the potential criminal to prove our fears wrong by
active renunciation or abandonment because we criminalize inchoate
crime for preemptive purposes and not because we believe inchoate crime,
in itself, deserves criminal blame and punishment.
G. Recidivist Sentencing Laws
Imposing enhanced sentences on recidivists permits punishment greater
than that authorized for the present crime. No one denies that such sen-
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tences have a preemptive incapacitative purpose, but the standard argu-
ment used to bring these sentences within the usual limits on state
intervention is that the recidivist  or habitual offender deserves the en-
hancement. An enhanced sentence might thus be analogized to a higher
sentence within the proportionate range deserved for a specific
crime.57
Many argue that although desert is a necessary justification for punish-
ment, it is not sufficient and also too imprecise to support a proportionality
principle that would warrant narrowly specific punishments for each type
of criminal conduct. Consequently, desert can do more than set a relatively
wide range of punishment for each crime. Criminals would deserve and
should serve at least the minimum for their crime, but would not deserve
and should not serve more than the maximum.
Within the deserved range, however, the sentencing authority would have
the discretion to use consequential concerns, such as potential dangerous-
ness or amenability to rehabilitation, to set the specific sentence. I oppose
such proposals,58 but they are considered fair and sensible because no
criminal receives more punishment than he or she deserves, and the law is
able to respond practically to considerations other than desert. In such a
scheme, two offenders who committed the identical crime under identical
circumstances concerning the crime could receive very different sentences.
Thus, those criminals who receive longer sentences because they are dan-
gerous are being preventively detained acceptably because they also deserve
what they are getting. If enhanced sentences have a similar desert rationale,
a preemptive component becomes less problematic. The desert claim is
therefore popular among proponents of enhanced sentencing because
enhancement thus appears justified by the dominant, mixed retributive and
consequential theory of punishment. This claim is controversial, however,
and I believe, implausible.
When an offender has served the deserved sentence authorized for a
particular offense, the legal and moral slate is clean. Further offenses of
a previous offender are no worse per se, and the further victims are no
more harmed than if the offense were the offender’s first. The recidivist
demonstrates greater antisocial tendencies, a worse character, and is surely
more likely to commit further crimes than the single offender, but being
antisocial, having a bad character, and being at greater risk for criminal
conduct are not punishable crimes in the United States. Our enhanced
fear of multiple offenders is justified, but the enhancement of their
sentences reflects primarily that fear and not the multiple offender’s
desert.
57. See Norval Morris, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 148–50 (1982). Indeed, the mixed
retributive-consequential justification for punishment that uses a proportionate range is prob-
ably the dominant view in the United States today.
58. See Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1491–1503
(1984).
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Even if one agrees with the foregoing brief argument—and many, of
course, do not—it is plausible to claim that multiple offenders are on notice
that they may be preventively detained. Consequently, by reoffending they
waive the moral right to proportionate criminal punishment.59 This claim
initially appears attractive, because it seems to justify preventive detention
within the theoretical limits of the traditional criminal justice system. Upon
further reflection, however, the claim has a moral drawback: The state
should not act immorally by punishing too harshly, even if the criminal
“consents.” Disproportionate punishment is simply wrong. People can of
course consent to the risk of harms being imposed on them. The law allows
boxers to fight and patients to undergo life-endangering medical treat-
ments. In  such  cases, however, the  activity is itself morally and  legally
acceptable. When the activity is not acceptable—homicide or aggravated
assault, for example—the law does not allow the victim’s consent to justify
the conduct. It is still wrong and the harmdoer will be punished.
Similarly, disproportionate punishment is wrong, even if the criminal
“consents” by committing the crime. Furthermore, if enhanced punish-
ment is not deserved, the additional incarceration is for dangerousness, not
for culpability, and thus the addition is not deserved punishment. I believe
that enhanced sentencing is pure preventive detention imposed under the
guise of criminal punishment. At most, the retributive argument for it,
which would bring enhanced sentences within the usual limiting justifica-
tion for detention, is controversial and flimsy.
H. Capital Punishment for “Dangerousness”
The most extreme form of preventive action within the criminal justice
system is, of course, capital punishment based on the aggravating factor of
“dangerousness.” In such cases, desert is a necessary but not sufficient
justification for the imposition of the death penalty. If the convicted crimi-
nal poses a substantial danger, death is justified unless there are sufficient
mitigating factors to warrant a lesser sentence. The potential for future
criminal behavior is not itself wrongdoing, however, even if the defendant
is at fault for being the type of person who presents such danger. Death for
dangerousness is preventive, the ultimate enhancement beyond the punish-
ment deserved for the convict’s past crime.
59. See C.S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289, 293–300 (1983)
(presenting a justification for punishment based on the theory that offenders consent to forgo
their immunity from punishment by committing criminal acts). Larry Alexander suggests that
consent has draconian implications, in that it can justify any punishment, no matter how
disproportionate. Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
178, 179–82 (1986). But see C.S. Nino, Does Consent Override Proportionality?, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
183 (1986) (responding to Alexander’s critique by setting forth and discussing some of the
presuppositions of his own thesis).
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I. Self-Defense
My final example of preemption in the criminal law is the justified use
of force prior to the formal commencement of criminal proceedings. To
simplify, I shall discuss only deadly force in self-defense by private citizens.
Recall the criteria for justified deadly force: The person must honestly
and reasonably believe that an unlawful aggressor is threatening death,
grievous bodily harm or certain, especially heinous, felonies such as rape
or kidnapping, and the person must honestly and reasonably believe that
the threatened harm is imminent. Justifiable defensive force must be nec-
essary and proportionate. Unless the harm is imminent, defensive force
is unnecessary to avoid harm because other, less fatal, means, such as
seeking the help of law enforcement, would be possible. Moreover, deadly
self-defense is proportionate only if the harms threatened are extremely
serious.
Finally, the honesty and reasonableness of the defender’s belief about the
imminent threat indicate that the defender is properly morally and legally
motivated. The presumed aggressor need not actually be threatening un-
lawful, imminent, and deadly harm. It is sufficient if the defender reason-
ably believes that this is the case. If these conditions are met, the person
may justifiably kill the presumed aggressor. The law thus grants private
citizens the right ex ante to take the law into their own hands, to kill
preemptively, under the limited set of conditions the criteria for self-
defense impose.60
The justification for self-defense appears unproblematically straightfor-
ward, but in fact it is controversial.61 Nonetheless, I believe that it is fair
to claim that the dominant view, which covers most cases, is this: A tragic
but apparently inevitable confrontation will result in the death or other
appalling infringement on the right of a blameless person, unless she
regrettably takes the life of a person who entirely reasonably appears to
be an unlawful aggressor. In other words, the defender behaves as an
ethical citizen when she concludes that she is imminently about to be
killed or to become the victim of another grievous infringement of her
rights. There is no alternative. Both participants in the confrontation are
people, deserving of all the respect and dignity we morally and legally
accord to people, but if one must die to prevent dreadful harm to the
other, it is better that the apparently blameworthy agent should be killed.
In essence, I do not believe that the most general justification is that the
aggressor forfeits his or her rights or that self-defense protects personal
60. The dominant view is that the reasonable but mistaken defender is justified in using
deadly force. In other words, killing in such circumstances is not wrongful, is permissible, and
perhaps is even the right thing to do under the circumstances.
61. For expositions of the various arguments, see George P. Fletcher, A CRIME OF SELF-
DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 27–36 (1988); Suzanne Uniacke, PERMISSIBLE
KILLING (1994).
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sovereignty, although elements of both may obtain. Rather, I believe that
self-defense is justified by the more general principle that properly
motivated agents  should commit the lesser evil. In emergency circum-
stances, it is better that a blameless, well-motivated person should be safe
and the general right to live of an apparently blameworthy agent should
yield.
This account is perfectly plausible, but note that it justifies private
deadly force in a vast number of cases in which death is not ordinarily
warranted. For example, the account justifies homicide in cases of rea-
sonable mistake in which the tragic choice does not actually exist.62 More-
over, even if the choice is real, justifiable killing does not provide the
aggressor with the protections of due process, and it applies in cases in
which the death penalty would not be justified. Indeed, in large numbers
of cases in which self-defensive deadly force is justified, capital punishment
would be unconstitutional. The justified self-defender is justified to kill
without legal probable cause or proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the apparent aggressor was an unlawful, “capitally criminal” aggressor. Self-
defense therefore obtains in cases in which there is no deadly danger or
in which there is such danger but it would not justify death after lawful
due process proceedings. Most victims of deadly self-defense do not de-
serve death.
Finally, even some of the most hoary limitations on self-defense, such as
the imminence or immediacy criterion that is a proxy for the emergency
need for  private  action, are under attack because  they  do not  permit
potential victims sufficient grounds to protect themselves.63 In sum, pro-
vided that they act reasonably—and the criteria for reasonableness are
weighty when deadly force is used—private citizens have extensive warrant
for preemptive action to prevent feared harms.
62. Many wish to treat reasonable mistake as an excusing condition because objectively
there was no need to use deadly force. If the self-defensive killing was not actually necessary,
the reasonably mistaken defender has acted wrongfully, but should be excused. See Paul H.
Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 100–24 (1997). If the latter view is correct,
then reasonable but mistaken self-defense does not qualify as an example of legally authorized,
private preemption.
I find the minority, “objective” view implausible. The borderline between justification and
excuse can be notoriously hazy. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and
Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984). In general, however, justifications are ex ante action-
guiding rules addressed to all citizens that tell them when it is right, or at least permissible, to
cause otherwise prohibited harms. In contrast, excuses are ex post, individualized exonerating
factors that indicate that the wrongdoer was not responsible. A careful, reasonable citizen who
acts properly under the circumstances is entirely responsible for her conduct, and what more
can we ask of any citizen than that she do the right thing under the circumstances. It is
profoundly regrettable if the right thing to do causes unnecessary harm, but in a world of
inevitably imperfect information and action-guiding rules that tell us how to behave in such a
world, the reasonably mistaken agent has surely acted rightly.
63. See, Stephen J. Morse, The “New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome,” 14 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 12
(Winter/Spring 1995); Robert F. Schopp, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS 99–102
(1998).
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J. Implications of Positive Law
The implicit argument of Part II has been that the laws and practices
canvassed—civil commitment of sexually violent predators, present and
potential Foucha exceptions, pretrial bail denial based on dangerousness,
some “redefinitions” of the mens rea elements of crimes, “preventive detec-
tion,” inchoate crime, enhanced sentencing of recidivists, capital punish-
ment, and justifiable private use of force—all demonstrate that our legal
system already employs or permits substantial preemptive, liberty-infringing
action to promote safety when the usual justifications for substantial liberty
infringement—crime and disease—are absent or are dwarfed by considera-
tions of danger. The transparent, unsuccessful attempts to justify many of
these laws and practices with the usual disease and culpability justifications
simply confirm that courts and legislatures recognize that they are trans-
gressing the usual boundaries in the interest of public safety. Examination
of positive law suggests that the demand for safety justifies the acceptance
of some degree of preemption for responsible agents.
None of these laws or practices clearly involves “pure” preemption, how-
ever. That is, none permits intervention without a prior history of danger-
ous conduct and at least some plausible nonresponsibility or culpability
claim. Thus, the primary public safety justification, although often denied,
may have substantial theoretical and practical purchase. It is clear that we
do accept some justifiable preemption in such cases. Part III considers
whether the demand for safety will also justify pure preemption.
III. RIGHTS, SAFETY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY: LIBERTY
HANGS BY A TECHNOLOGICAL THREAD
It is a commonplace that the rights to be left alone and to be safe are both
precious and sometimes conflict with each other. Everyone has a right to
pursue harmless projects and to be left alone. The state must leave people
alone, even if people think very bad thoughts and are potentially very bad,
unless they are nonresponsibly dangerous or unless they harm others.
Everyone also has a right to be free from unjustifiable, intentional harm
from others. The state may infringe liberty to protect individuals from such
harms and individuals may sometimes privately infringe the liberty of others
to protect themselves.
In most present cases of preemption justified by desert or disease, there
is a past history of dangerous conduct or a reasonably clear threat of future
violence. To use Randy Barnett’s term, the agent is “communicating” a
threat, a condition that should be sufficient to trigger preventive detention
to protect the interests of potential victims.64 If the threat is sufficiently
64. See Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime
Distinction, 76 B.U.L. REV. 157, 160–64 (1996). Professor Barnett does not extend the concept
of communication to threats presented by nonresponsible agents. Id. at 165. There is no
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credible, even in the absence of an identifiable victim or sufficient conduct
to satisfy the definition of a criminal attempt, the justification for interven-
tion is powerful. The rights of innocent potential victims surely would
trump the rights of future harmdoers.
At present, however, we are loathe to intervene in the lives of responsible
agents. We fear that our predictions of future violence are likely to be
inaccurate because predictive technology is insufficient and bias will in-
trude. Moreover, fear of unacceptable rates of false positives in the absence
of previous dangerous conduct and distaste for doctors becoming “jailers”
are primary criticisms of dangerousness criteria for involuntary civil com-
mitment and an impetus to more paternalistic criteria, such as need for
treatment or grave disability,65
Suppose, however, that predictive technology existed that would allow
society to predict with great accuracy that a fully responsible agent who had
neither thought bad thoughts nor done bad deeds would in the future
intentionally cause unjustified serious harm, but that the technology would
not allow society to predict when or to whom the harm would occur. Others
have the right not to be intentionally harmed by the agent. Would that
person nonetheless have the ordinary right to pursue harmless projects free
of state intervention until the intentional harm occurred or was reasonably
believed to  be imminent? If not,  what  form of  intervention  would be
justified? Could the state monitor the person’s activities with otherwise
unacceptably intrusive intensity? Could the state compel the person to
receive “treatment” or other less benign interventions to reduce the dan-
gerous propensity? Could the state confine the person?
What, if anything, would justify purely preemptive action to prevent
danger? The traditional answer is, of course, “nothing.” Our society does
not accept pure prevention of responsible agents. But if it did, the probable
justification would be a limited form of self-defense: The usual right to be
left alone yields when the anticipated harm is very serious and we can be
quite sure that the harm will occur unless preventive action is taken.66
reason, however, not to consider the threats of such agents communications, even in the
absence of a past history of violent conduct.
65. See John Monahan, Mary Ruggiero, & Herbert D. Friedlander, Stone-Roth Model of Civil
Commitment and the California Dangerousness Standard: Operational Comparison, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSY-
CHIATRY 1267 (1982) (describing the opposition to the dangerousness standard and reporting
based on an empirical study that 86% of the patients in the study sample who were committed on
grounds of dangerousness would have also met more paternalistic criteria); Stephen J. Morse, A
Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 54 (1982) (discussing the problem of false positives); see also Steven P. Segal, Margaret A.
Watson, Stephen M. Goldfinger, & David S. Averbuck, Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric Emergency
Room: II. Mental Disorder Indicators and Three Dangerousness Criteria, 45 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 753
(1988) (clinicians can employ a dangerousness scale of unknown validity reliably, and perceived
dangerousness to others was associated with major mental disorder and severity of symptoms).
66. See Barnett, supra note 64, at 160–64; and Phillip Montague, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL-DE-
FENSE 42–48, 61 (1995) (providing a preemptive justification for self-defense by individuals and
by states against other, potentially hostile states and recognizing the epistemic problems often
attending preemptive action).
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Under such conditions, perhaps it is unreasonable to wait until harm is
imminent. A society should be permitted to strike preemptively to defend
itself, and so should private individuals if recourse to the state is unreason-
able. The potential for danger is simply too great to risk waiting for harm
to become imminent in the hope that one could in the future successfully
perceive imminent harm and successfully intervene then to prevent it. As a
matter of justice, the balance of evils would be positive. Behind the veil of
ignorance, would not we all agree to limited, humane preemptive strikes for
the safety of all?
Consider the following example from international relations, in which
the preemptive striker was not justified by international law.67 You may
recall that in 1981 the Israeli military bombed a nuclear reactor that Iraq
was building. Iraq  claimed that  the  reactor  was  being built for  purely
peaceful purposes and an Iraqi nuclear attack on Israel was not plausibly
imminent according to any traditional definition of imminence. The Is-
raelis nonetheless had good reason to fear Iraq’s intentions, for the poten-
tial destruction of the State of Israel was at stake. Despite much
hand-wringing and good arguments that the Israelis had violated interna-
tional law, most people who love peace surely breathed a sigh of relief and
thought, at least privately, that the Israelis had done the right thing. If Iraq
had nuclear weapons, for example, its later invasion of Kuwait would have
been vastly more dangerous to regional and world peace than it was. Recall
that Iraq attacked Israel during the Gulf War with Scud missiles although
Israel was not a belligerent. Suppose the warheads were nuclear? Should
Israel have waited until Iraq had nuclear weapons pointed at Israel? If so,
what should it have done then?
Prediction technology is now insufficiently developed practically to permit
preemptive strikes.68 Any predictive technology is sure to produce large num-
bers of false-positive predictions, especially when predicting low base-rate be-
havior, such as homicide or other types of especially serious violent conduct.
In addition to its alleged desert rationale, imminence therefore has an im-
portant prediction rationale as a criterion for social or private self-defense, as
reflected in attempt and self-defense doctrines, for example. There is a posi-
tive relation between the likelihood of actual aggression and its imminence.
But what if predictive accuracy was sufficient to satisfy an accuracy crite-
rion for preemption? Elsewhere I have argued that if the technology existed
67. See Brun-Otto Bryde, Self-Defense, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 213
(1982). I have often independently used the example in conversation, but George Fletcher
used it in print and therefore deserves credit. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense, supra note 61, at
20.
68. See Morse, Blame and Danger, supra note 7, at 126–29; Vernon L. Quinsey, Grant T. Harris,
Marnie E. Rice, & Catherine A. Cormier, VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK
(1998) (reporting newer research results indicating better but not extremely high accuracy).
See generally Nicholas Rescher, PREDICTING THE FUTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
FORECASTING 133–56, 191–246 (1998) (evaluating the pitfalls to predictive accuracy in general
and to successful prediction of human behavior in particular).
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for correctly predicting all or most future behavior, our view of ourselves
and many of our moral and legal arrangements would be quite different
from those at present.69 A less extreme case is possible, however, that makes
pure preemption imaginable and potentially practicable at present without
threatening our self-conception and all that flows therefrom. This scenario
obtains if predictive accuracy is high only in limited circumstances, with
limited groups, especially if the people accurately predicted were somehow
“different” according to some morally acceptable criterion.
For example, some commentators believe that we are starting to ap-
proach such predictive success for people with “abnormal” sexual desires
and histories of past violent conduct.70 Few would find this category morally
unacceptable as a basis for differential treatment on the ground that the
perception of difference was based on irrational animus. Assuming that we
could predict the behavior of potential sexually violent offenders accurately,
would these people have a right to be left alone until harm was imminent?
I suggest that as a theoretical matter, if the following criteria were met,
pure preventive action should be justifiable: (1) if the potential harm were
sufficiently grave; (2) if the prediction technology were sufficiently accu-
rate; (3) if the preventive response were maximally humane and minimally
intrusive under the circumstances; and (4) if the preventive action was
preceded by adequate due process. The potential grave harm would give
the state a compelling reason to intervene.
How grave is grave enough might be a matter of dispute, but I am
assuming that the infringement of pure preventive action should be justi-
fied only by very serious harms, indeed. Others might be less restrictive,
however. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the potentially
indefinite confinement of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity
for shoplifting on the ground that minor property crime was a sufficient
predicate for the dangerousness component of the commitment.71 The
Court was untroubled by the relatively harmless nature of the acquittee’s
crime and ruled that dangerousness should not be confused with violence.
The majority argued that theft was a danger to society and often led to
violent crime, so potential theft was a sufficient basis for a finding of
dangerousness. Jones involved traditional preventive detention, however.
Michael Jones was not a morally and legally responsible agent, but he had
committed wrongful behavior. In the case of pure preemption, let us make
the soothing assumption that the potential for more grave harm would be
required to satisfy the need for a compelling state interest.
Sufficient predictive accuracy would solve the related problems of unac-
ceptably high false-positive rates and of unnecessary overcommitment.
Again, how much accuracy would be required would be a normative ques-
69. Morse, Blame and Danger, supra note 7, at 115–16.
70. Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual
Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709 (1992).
71. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, n.14 at 365 (1983).
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tion. Whatever level were required, a past history of violence in theory
could be no more than an epistemic or evidentiary consideration. After all,
if we could predict future violence sufficiently and equally well without a
history of violence, then in theory there is no need substantively to require
a past history of violence. Nor would the principle of legality be violated by
a pure predictive scheme independent of past history. Pure prevention is
not justified by desert, nor is punishment appropriate. Therefore, no ques-
tion of a substantive need for action, fair notice of conduct and the like
arises. The legal decision maker will, of course, need reliable and valid
criteria to make the requisite prediction, but this concern is distinguishable
from criminal justice concerns for legality.72
To consider further the degree of accuracy that fair pure prevention
might require, compare the state’s burden of persuasion in criminal trials
and in traditional civil commitment: “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and
“clear and convincing evidence,” respectively. The burden of persuasion
for proving a probability standard is, of course, independent of the stand-
ard itself. There can be “maybe definites” (low burden of persuasion
needed to prove a high-probability standard) and “definite maybes” (high
burden of persuasion needed to prove a low-probability standard).73 But
burdens of persuasion do teach us about the law’s tolerance for error,
which should provide insight concerning the substantive accuracy rate that
would justify preemptive action.
In In re Winship74 the U.S. Supreme Court finally “constitutionalized” the
reasonable-doubt standard, holding that the state had to prove every ele-
ment of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The state had to
bear such a high risk of nonpersuasion because, if convicted, the defendant
faced the immense intrusions of losing liberty and stigma. To use the
chestnut, the Court was strongly favoring acquittal of the guilty to the
conviction of the innocent. In Addington v. Texas,75 the Court held that the
Constitution required the “intermediate,” clear-and-convincing evidence
standard in civil commitment cases. Although an innocent person’s liberty
was at stake, the Court rejected the reasonable-doubt standard because
commitment is not punitive and the factually improper release of one who
genuinely needs help is worse than acquitting the guilty. Finally, the Court
recognized the state’s interest in appropriate commitment and argued that,
given the nature of the evidence in commitment cases, the higher standard
might make it virtually impossible for the state to meet its persuasion
burden. In sum, the Court accepted in both cases that mistakes that would
wrongly lead to the loss of liberty were inevitable, but the Court was willing
to accept higher false-positive rates in commitment cases than in criminal
72. Cf. Barnett, supra note 64, at 167.
73. I owe this useful turn of phrase to John Monahan & David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof
and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 37 (1978).
74. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
75. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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trials. Even in the former, however, the potential patient’s liberty interest
warranted a  standard higher than the preponderance  of the  evidence
standard generally applicable in civil cases. The loss of liberty makes and
should make the law intolerant of error.
Pure preemption is different from either criminal conviction or tradi-
tional civil commitment. The potential harmdoer is innocent of any wrong-
doing, is not suffering from mental disorder, and does not need treatment
for a disorder in the traditional medical and psychological sense. But the
harmdoer may face an intrusion on liberty that rivals and even exceeds
criminal punishment or civil commitment. Further, identified potential
harmdoers would be stigmatized. All these considerations suggest that a
very high state burden of persuasion ought to obtain: That is, only very low
false-positive rates should be acceptable. In contrast, if the danger to poten-
tial innocent victims is grave and if it would be difficult to prove and thus
to prevent potential harm with a higher standard, Addington suggests that a
lower burden of persuasion and consequently higher false-positive rates
might be acceptable. In any case, the arguments for a higher burden of
persuasion suggest that the independent substantive standard for accuracy
ought also to be high.
Let us assume that the deprivation of liberty that pure preemption pro-
duces is so immense that predictive success would have to be correspond-
ingly high in general, and that, possibly, the accuracy required might vary
with the intrusiveness of the preventive action. The potential harmdoers
might still complain that they were being unfairly treated because others,
for whom the prediction of harm was not yet as successful, might be as
potentially  dangerous.  If the choices  of data to collect were based on
rational policy goals and the predictive technology did not focus on particu-
lar groups for discriminatory or other unacceptable reasons, this objection
would not be powerful, however. For example, if it is rational and nondis-
criminatory to collect data about and to try to predict the conduct of violent
sexual offenders, such offenders cannot complain if there are no data yet
concerning arsonists, who might also be dangerous. The Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee this type of “perfect”
equality.
Assuming normative consensus on the amount of potential harm and
predictive accuracy required and that some people meet this standard, and
assuming that the preemptive actions taken are the least intrusive necessary
to prevent the harm, what objections to pure preemptive action would
remain? One might be based on social constructivist complaints that soci-
ety’s definition of dangerous classes of people is an expression of power,
oppression or whatever, and not a reflection of real dangers, like the bad
bacteria that can kill us. Criminalization of the behavior of such people is
bad enough; intrusive preemption would be outrageous. This type of argu-
ment gains purchase from our society’s history of past, and alas present,
intolerance for many forms of harmless or trivially harmful behavior be-
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cause these behaviors allegedly are dangerous enough to warrant blame
and criminal punishment.76 But the argument could be obviated by precise
specification of serious criterial harms—such as homicide, forcible rape, or
maiming—that only shameless ideologues could deny were dangerous.
A second  objection might be  the familiar reductio of the “parade of
horribles.” Suppose, for example, we could predict future grave harmdoing
accurately when a child was newborn or even in utero. Imagine the intru-
sions that could follow, not only to the potential harmdoer, but also to third
parties, such as pregnant women. This objection is hackneyed, but it carries
more than a grain of truth. Once we are in the “good bacteria, bad bacteria”
narrative, then being humane becomes only a “side constraint” to our
consequential balancing. At the extremes, the psychological costs of an
intrusion might outweigh the benefit, but depending on the harm to be
prevented, society might well accept imposing immense psychological and
physical costs on those unfortunate enough to be potentially violent.
A less familiar objection concerns the causation of violent predisposition.
Although human beings are mostly genetically alike from place to place, the
rates of the most serious, violent crimes vary enormously across and within
countries and across time periods in the same place. This commonplace
observation suggests that environmental variables account for much of the
variance in the rates of grave harmdoing. Future dangerous conduct is not
simply a function of intrapersonal variables.
Some have used this observation to suggest that deprivation and other
types of alleged environmental causes of crime necessitate an excuse for
criminals exposed to these causes.77 The analogous argument would be that
society should remove or reduce criminogenic social conditions before
preemptively restraining the innocent agents caused to be dangerous by
those conditions. But social causation of criminal behavior is not per se an
excuse, even if one believes that the causal conditions are unjust, because
virtually all criminals retain the general capacity for rationality.78 If seem-
ingly unjust social conditions per se are thus irrelevant to criminal respon-
sibility, perhaps they should also be irrelevant in a pure preventive regime.
Nevertheless, justice might demand an asymmetrical response to retrospec-
tive moral evaluation and prospective preemption.
A rational criminal is at fault and deserves punishment, whatever may
have been the causal variables that produced the intentional prohibited
conduct. Sympathetic observers might feel regret or special sympathy for a
criminal whose conduct is in part the product of unjust social conditions,
76. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state statute prohibiting
adult, consenting, private homosexual conduct).
77. The most well-known exemplar was Judge David Bazelon. See David L. Bazelon, The
Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976). For a more recent example, see
Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Environmental Deprivation? 3 L. & INEQ. 9 (1985).
78. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985); Morse,
DEPRIVATION AND DESERT (2000, forthcoming).
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but no excuse is warranted.79 At least in the case of violent crimes, the
criminal knows that the conduct violates the law and exposes him or her to
punishment. The law can effectively operate as part of the agent’s practical
reason.
In the case of pure preventive action, however, the agent is entirely blame-
less at the moment of preemption. He or she has done nothing wrong yet
and the preemption scheme cannot effectively operate as part of the agent’s
practical reason. After all, the agent may be entirely unaware that he or she
is at risk for preemptive action. Unlike the criminal who can avoid acting
violently and receiving punishment, the potentially dangerous but currently
innocent agent cannot use practical reason and act intentionally to avoid the
intrusion, which, depending on the circumstances, might be severe. To
impose preemptive action, justice would therefore seem to demand not only
that ex post preemptive liberty infringements should be the least intrusive
necessary, but also that ex ante society should take all reasonable steps to
prevent unjust social conditions that produce predictable danger.
Two objections to this suggestion arise immediately. First, if the predictive
criteria were known, many people might be able to use practical reason to
avoid preemption. Aristotelians famously believe that people are capable of
training themselves to become more virtuous agents. Now, some predictive
variables, such as sex, might be static and unalterable by the exercise of
practical reason. But others, like employment status, and even character
traits, might very well be dynamic and subject to influence by reason.
Indeed, many, and perhaps most, of the variables affected by injustice are
likely to be dynamic and plastic. If this were true, the social-injustice argu-
ment is weakened because practical reason could be used to change the
equation to diminish the probability of future harmdoing.
Still, this objection is not decisive. Preventive action may be most efficient
when the potentially dangerous agent is young, before the agent becomes
responsible. Moreover, many plastic variables may play a role, but it is
possible that unmodifiable variables that injustice produces may account
for much of the variance in large numbers of cases.
For example, suppose that poverty systematically produced predisposing
biological variables as a result of, say, poor prenatal care and poor nutrition.
Suppose further that the effects of these predisposing variables could not
be easily altered by any means, even if society and the agent both tried. The
strength of this first objection will depend in large part on how the “world
works.” It is in any case an unforgiving objection.
The second objection raises a familiar paradox. Avoiding the injustice
that produces predictable danger might itself require vast intrusions on
liberty. Little imagination is necessary to envision dreadfully invasive social
engineering to “make people free.” Nonetheless, one can imagine less
79. Cf. Martha Klein, DETERMINISM, BLAMEWORTHINESS AND DEPRIVATION 89–91, 171–174
(1990) (arguing that justice demands reduced sentences in such cases because the criminal
has been punished in advance, has paid in advance, by being a victim of unjust conditions).
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intrusive social programs that might substantially reduce injustice and con-
sequent danger, thus meeting the second objection to the social-injustice
argument. This article is not the appropriate place to devise such programs,
but the general claim is surely plausible. Through reasonable social action,
the state can reduce the risk that victims of injustice will also be subject to
preemptive action. Behind the veil of ignorance, I think that we would
agree that this should be done to mitigate the intrusion of a regime of
preemptive strikes.
A final objection to preemptive action to prevent danger is that such
intrusions  are a form of  undeserved punishment. After all, preventive
detention might in many cases be the least intrusive alternative to prevent
the danger. For example, sexually violent predators may not be treatable,
and monitoring predators in the community is probably too cumbersome
and expensive to be feasible. Even if the conditions of commitment were
quite comfortable—indeed, even if the material conditions of the detainee
were more comfortable than the material conditions of liberty—detention
is a massive deprivation that will appear and feel punitive to the detainee.
Compelled “treatments” and other measures might likewise seem punitive.
Nonetheless, pure preemption is not punishment. Although preemptive
action will in many cases intentionally impose conditions that are painful,
the pain is neither desired nor necessary. Dangerous propensities might be
reduced through quite nonintrusive means, such as benign and comfort-
ably administered medication, and many painful things we require of citi-
zens, such as sending soldiers into battle, are not punitive. Further, pure
preemption is not an expression of blame and it is not imposed to deter. I
believe that the claim that preemptive strikes are punitive is dependent on
the prior conclusion that preemption is unjustified, rather than being the
premise for that conclusion.
A general regime of preemption would not be acceptable at present
according to the criteria I have addressed. Large numbers of people present
a risk of sufficiently  grave harm to justify preemption, but  we  cannot
identify them with sufficient accuracy; we lack reasonably affordable means
to prevent the danger from occurring, and society has not done all that it
reasonably could to reduce injustice  and consequent risk. Even if the
regime were limited to particularly high-risk groups and there were few false
negatives—that is, among the high-risk groups, most dangerous people
would be accurately identified and preempted—there would inevitably be
high rates of false positives and detention would almost always be the
preferred mode of intrusion. Substantial harm might be avoided, but the
unnecessary loss of liberty and the financial costs would both be huge.
Finally, in my view, the injustice would also be great. In sum, pure preemp-
tion just is not worth the cost at present.
The discussion thus far suggests that liberty hangs by a technological
thread. That is, we cannot justify pure preemption because we lack the
technology to impose such a regime at acceptable cost. If the technology
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improved  sufficiently, however, I have suggested that  pure preemption
would be justified under very limited conditions. I believe that to be true,
and I offer a complementary prediction: When the technology reaches that
stage, the legislatures and the Supreme Court will agree. Hendricks is just the
beginning. The real danger is that driven by fear—the oncoming onslaught
of the “superpredators”80 and all that—we will institute pure preemption
under less limited conditions. This will be unjust because no respectable
social-defensive theory can warrant a regime that will tolerate so much loss
of liberty for so little benefit.
IV. JUDY AND J.T. NORMAN: A CASE STUDY IN CURRENT
PREEMPTIVE FUTILITY
On the night of June 12, 1985, after her husband, John Thomas (J.T.)
Norman, fell asleep, Judy Norman took her grandchild to Judy’s mother’s
house, extracted a pistol from her mother’s purse, returned to her home,
pointed the weapon at the back of her sleeping husband’s head, and pulled
the trigger, but the gun jammed. She unjammed it and fired one shot in the
back of J.T.’s head. Judy felt his chest and discovered that her husband was
still breathing and making sounds. She then shot J.T. twice more in the back
of the head. That same night, Judy Norman admitted to the deputy sheriff
who arrested her that she killed J.T. because “she took all she was going to
take from him so she shot him.”81
The story she told is both horrifying and not uncommon. Judy was 39
years old. She and J.T. had been married almost 25 years and got along well
when he was sober. But J.T. suffered from chronic alcoholism and when
drunk he had continuously subjected her to brutal physical and emotional
abuse, beginning about the fifth year of their marriage. He beat, tortured
and degraded Judy, including forcing her to make money by prostitution.
On numerous occasions he threatened to kill and to maim her. On those
occasions when she left home to escape the abuse, J.T. always found her,
brought her home, and beat her.
The day before the homicide, J.T. drove while intoxicated to a highway
rest area where Judy was engaging in prostitution. He assaulted her and
then drove home, but during the drive he was stopped by a patrol officer
and jailed for driving while impaired. After Judy’s mother arranged J.T.’s
release from jail that same day, he continued drinking and abusing Judy.
Indeed, he seemed particularly angry after his release, and his abuse esca-
lated. Sheriff’s deputies were called to the Norman house that evening. Judy
complained that J.T. had been beating her all day and that she could not
80. William J. Bennett et al., BODY COUNT 26–29 (1996).
81. State v. Norman, 378 S.E. 2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989). All facts in the text are taken from the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s opinion. There was no substantial dispute about the events
preceding the homicide.
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take it any more. The deputies advised her to file a complaint, but Judy told
them that she was afraid that J.T. would kill her if she had him arrested. The
deputies told her that they could do nothing without a formal complaint
and they left. An hour later the deputies returned because Judy had taken
a bottle of pills in an apparent suicide attempt. J.T. called her names, cursed
her, and told the attending paramedics to let her die. A deputy finally
chased J.T. back into the house as the ambulance rushed Judy to the
hospital. Her stomach was pumped and she was sent home with her mother.
During her brief stay in the hospital, Judy discussed with a therapist either
filing charges against J.T. or having him committed. Judy agreed to go to a
mental health center the following day to discuss these possibilities. She also
expressed anger toward J.T. and threatened to kill him.
The next day, on which the homicide occurred, Judy did go to the mental
health center to discuss filing charges or trying to commit J.T. and then she
confronted J.T. with the possibility of commitment. Her husband re-
sponded that he would “see them coming” and would cut her throat before
they reached him. Also that day, Judy went to the social services office to
seek welfare benefits, but J.T. followed her there, interrupted the interview,
and forced her to go home with him. He then continued to abuse Judy by
threatening to kill and maim her, slapping and kicking her, throwing ob-
jects at her, and burning her by putting out one of her cigarettes on her
upper torso. He did not let her eat or bring food into the house for the
children. Later that evening, when they went together to their bedroom to
lie down, J.T. called Judy a “dog” and made her lie on the floor. Their
daughter brought their baby grandchild into the bedroom and the Nor-
mans agreed to baby-sit. After J.T. fell asleep, the baby started crying. Judy
took the child to Judy’s mother’s house so that it would not awaken J.T.
At her mother’s residence, Judy took a pistol from her mother’s purse
and then returned to the house with the gun and killed J.T. Charged and
tried for first-degree murder, the jury found Judy guilty of the lesser-in-
cluded offense of manslaughter. Judy’s attorney appealed on the ground
that the jury was not, but should have been, instructed to consider self-
defense. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the conviction
because J.T.’s potential threat of death or grievous bodily harm, which
might otherwise have justified the use of deadly force in self-defense, was
not imminent when Judy shot him. While J.T. was asleep, Judy had alter-
natives to deadly force, the court opined, and thus deadly force was not
justified.
It is impossible to read this terrible story without horror and pity. It is also
impossible not to feel anger and regret that the abuse and the death were
not prevented.82 There were so many times at which some intervention
82. Some might not be angry about the killing of J.T. because they might believe that he got
what he deserved. But as I argue below, the death penalty would not have been justified even
if J.T. had been arrested, tried, and convicted for all the crimes he committed against Judy. He
deserved hard time, but his death, too, was a tragedy.
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might have made a life-affirming and life-saving difference. In this case
study, however, I wish to focus on the gravest harm the case presented, the
denouement: Judy’s killing of J.T. Let us suppose that the therapist, who
visited Judy in the hospital and who observed Judy’s anger and depression
and heard her numerous threats to kill J.T., believed that Judy would try to
kill J.T. Let us assume further, as is almost certainly the case if we take the
criteria for civil commitment seriously, that Judy was not then sufficiently
disordered to warrant civil commitment.83 It is also clear that even if Judy
truly did form the firm intent to kill J.T. while she was in the hospital, Judy
had not then gone far enough toward killing J.T. to satisfy the act require-
ment for attempt liability. Thus, when third parties first learned of Judy’s
possible homicidal intent, they had little legal purchase to intervene invol-
untarily. Indeed, even under the most expansive definitions of attempt,
Judy did not meet the criteria until, at the least, she took the pistol from her
mother, and in many jurisdictions, that would not have been enough. The
civil and criminal law, properly applied, were essentially powerless to stop
Judy Norman from killing her husband even if the relevant authorities were
justifiably convinced that the probability of homicide was high.
Now let us shift focus. Judy Norman married at 14, lived in a rural part
of  western North Carolina,84 was forced by  J.T. to make her living by
prostitution, had children at home to look after, and, although I do not
know this, it is fair to infer that she had little education, few occupational
skills, and no resources. It is also fair to infer that her community was not
well-served by shelters or other institutions devoted to protecting victims of
domestic violence. Indeed, there was no public response when J.T. forced
her to leave the social service office and Judy rightly assumed that law
enforcement could not really protect her. Almost certainly, even if Judy had
filed a complaint and cooperated in a prosecution of J.T., it is highly
unlikely that he would have served serious time or that jail would have
reformed his drinking and violent tendencies, and it is correspondingly
83. Judy had just made a suicide attempt, but the hospital was willing to release her
immediately, so I assume that she did not make a very serious attempt and that she was not
suffering from a major mental disorder that would justify ordinary civil commitment. Of
course, people who do not meet the criteria for commitment are routinely committed, and
certainly the hospital could have detained her. Any judge would approve commitment of a
person who had just attempted suicide, even if the attempt was not seriously lethal. But let us
assume, as is almost certainly correct, that the civil commitment system followed its own criteria
and that Judy was not formally committable. And even if she had been committed, the term
would have been brief at most—a matter of days—and her cycle with J.T. would have contin-
ued.
In many jurisdictions, the prediction of danger to J.T. would be sufficient to impose a duty
on the therapist to warn J.T. of the danger. In this case, however, a reasonable therapist might
have concluded that warning J.T. might be more dangerous to Judy than Judy’s risk to J.T.
84. The events took place and Judy Norman was tried in Rutherford County. According to
the 1990 Census, the county population was almost 57,000. Approximately 42,000 people lived
in mostly nonfarm rural areas and about 15,000 lived in an “urban” area the Census describes
as “outside urbanized area.” No one lived “inside urbanized area.”
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likely that he would have emerged from incarceration more disposed than
ever to hurt Judy.
Moreover, even if her husband were imprisoned for a time, we may
safely assume that Judy lacked the resources and skills to move to another
location,  where she could live  an economically and socially viable  life
with her children and where J.T. could not find her. Finally, Judy could
have armed herself and waited for the next assault, but this would have
been a dreadfully risky strategy that was likely to result in her death if
she failed to kill J.T.
In sum, while her husband was asleep in the bed, it was entirely reason-
able for Judy Norman to conclude that it was completely predictable that
he would abuse her brutally in the near future, and despite the contrary but
facile conclusions of the North Carolina Supreme Court, it was entirely
reasonable for Judy Norman to believe that no one was really able to protect
her and that there was nowhere to hide. Nonetheless, J.T.’s threat was not
imminent according to traditional self-defense doctrine. What should Judy
Norman have done to protect herself from her husband’s future, certain,
vicious, and possibly lethal violence? Judy was essentially powerless to pro-
tect herself by lawful means.
I have asserted that society lacked the legal means to prevent Judy from
killing J.T. and that Judy lacked effective legal and practical means to
prevent J.T. from abusing her. This appears to be a lamentable state of legal
affairs. After all, her husband was a serious felon who deserved serious time
for brutally abusing Judy, but he never intentionally tried to kill her and he
did not deserve to die. If convicted for his undeniably terrible crimes, and
even if no mitigation were allowed for his alcoholism or for other problems
he surely had, capital punishment would have been both unconstitutional
and morally unthinkable.
Similarly, Judy was not responsible for and did not deserve her husband’s
abuse. And recall, if one is even tempted to argue that she was at least in
part complicit in her own misery because she stayed with him, Judy had
tried to leave, but J.T. prevented her.
What could have been done? How could the killing and the abuse have
been prevented? One possible means of preventing the homicide would
have been to detain Judy preventively (or to impose some other type of
liberty-infringing regime), but this would have required pure preventive
detention, based solely on a risk estimate. When her threat first became
evident and highly credible, Judy was not suffering from a mental disorder
or other condition warranting traditional civil commitment. I am assuming
that some type of “battered victim syndrome,” which Judy may have been
suffering from according to some defense experts, would not be a justifiable
basis for traditional civil commitment on the ground that her syndrome-
produced failure to leave her husband rendered her dangerous to herself.
In a word, the law might authorize a broader, public preemptive response
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to danger, justified by the danger simpliciter and by the lack of reasonable
alternatives.
To protect Judy, another possibility is that the law could extend the
justification of  deadly self-defense in circumstances such as those Judy
faced. That is, the law might permit a broader, private preemptive re-
sponse to danger, justified by the danger and by the lack of reasonable
alternatives.
I believe that the parallel problems of preemptive, preventive action that
Norman presents are instructive. My claim is that at present nothing could
be done to prevent Judy Norman from killing her spouse, even if pure
preemption were available, but that the killing should have been justified
as lawful self-defense. The criteria for private preemption should be loos-
ened in appropriate, limited cases. To simplify the analysis again, I will focus
only on the final days of J.T.’s life, but much could be said about the 20 years
of the abusive relationship that preceded and produced the homicide.
Judy Norman told a therapist the night before she killed her husband
that she intended to do it. Was it a “firm” intention?: Probably not, but it
was credible under the circumstances. Judy presented a potential but real
threat. Was there any legal step that could have been taken to prevent her
from killing J.T.? I have already mentioned that neither traditional civil
commitment nor attempt liability was available.  Simply uttering  verbal
threats is not necessarily evidence that the speaker is crazy, especially in this
case, and it is surely insufficient action to support a finding of probable
cause for attempted homicide. Neither desert nor disease was present, and
Judy Norman does not qualify for any other traditional gap-filling form of
preemption.
Would pure preemption have  helped? The harm threatened—homi-
cide—was sufficiently grave. But how accurately can we predict homicide,
very low base-rate behavior, under the circumstances of this case? Let us
consider some of the standard, mostly demographic variables that social
science indicates would be predictively valid: age, gender, socioeconomic
status (SES), prior history, drug use. Judy is a 39-year-old woman of low SES
status with no previous history of violence. To the best of our knowledge,
she does not abuse drugs. Among these variables, only low SES is a height-
ened risk factor, and it is much less important than virtually all the others,
which suggest lesser risk. Women of Judy’s age with no history of violence
and drug use do not commit much homicide.
Individuating a bit more, we note that Judy was a victim of abuse and
made an apparently serious verbal threat. I know of no data that would
allow us to use these additional variables validly to calculate the odds ratio
beyond the base-rate of homicide for people demographically like Judy. The
base-rate is tiny, however, and even if Judy was much more likely to kill than
her demographic peers, the actual probability would be very, very low
indeed. Even the most precise prediction table or equation would vastly and
unacceptably overpredict in this case. Moreover, what would be the appro-
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priate preemptive intervention? Detention? If so, for what purpose beyond
separating Judy from her husband for a period, under what conditions, and
perhaps most important, for how long? Therapy? Again, what type and for
what precise purpose? A specific, sensible, affordable, and effective inter-
vention is difficult to devise.
Finally, would not any intervention aimed at Judy be an unjust form of
victim blaming? Who is the problem: Judy or her spouse? She tried to leave
but J.T. prevented her. Neither law enforcement nor social services offered
realistic help. Before we coercively intervene in Judy’s life and deprive her
of substantial liberty, does not justice demand that we try to help her first,
either by helping her leave her husband or by restraining him?
In sum, pure preemption of Judy Norman would not have been justified
at present. But if we could predict Judy’s homicide accurately, if a tailored
intervention were sensible, and if other social interventions had been tried
first but were unsuccessful, then with regret society might properly preempt
Judy. For now, however, she must be left at liberty.
Judy should not have been convicted of manslaughter, however, because
her killing was no more preemptive than the present theory of self-defense,
properly understood, already permits. Judy reasonably believed that J.T.
presented a threat of death or grievous bodily harm, in response to which
deadly force would be proportionate. The only genuine issue is whether the
threat was imminent. Recall that the justifiable use of private defensive force
requires that the threat must be imminent, because if there is a reasonable
alternative to the private use of force, it must be employed. Judy killed her
spouse when he was defenseless himself, drunkenly asleep in bed, and
therefore presented no imminent threat by traditional standards. But sup-
pose the imminence criterion is simply a proxy for its underlying rationale,
namely that defensive force is justified only if there is no reasonable alter-
native.
Judged by the rationale of a rational imminence standard, the harm was
imminent. Judy had nowhere to hide and no other reasonable, lawful
alternative, including waiting for the next deadly attack. It was simply too
risky. I am not suggesting that the state of nature obtained in Rutherford
County, North Carolina, in 1985. A sufficiently intact criminal justice system
existed to charge, try, convict, and imprison Judy Norman for killing her
husband. Still, no adequate means other than killing J.T. existed for her to
protect herself from his virtually certain future, death-endangering vio-
lence. Judy Norman had no reasonable alternative and justifiably killed J.T.
At the least, Judy Norman should have been given self-defense instructions
and the jury should have been permitted to consider whether the use of
deadly force was justified.
Loosening the imminence criterion would not justify widespread private
vengeance or “open season” on abusive people, nor would it invite an
expanded “battered victim syndrome” defense. My claim fits within the
rationale for traditional self-defense doctrine. The defender would have to
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demonstrate that she reasonably believed that there was no reasonable
alternative possible. Only then would the use of private force be necessary
because the harm was legally imminent. In most locations and under most
circumstances, such a showing may be difficult or impossible if the threat is
not temporally immediate. But to assert that there is always a reasonable
alternative that any reasonable person would recognize is to blink reality.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT TO DO UNTIL
THE DOCTOR COMES
Until the good doctor comes and shows us all how to produce only good
bacteria, the short answer to what to do is, “not much.” We cannot prophy-
lactically use powerful, wide-spectrum antibiotics. Such medications will kill
too many good bacteria in addition to the bad. At most we should take them
prophylactically only if we are faced with conditions in which it is virtually
certain that otherwise the bad bacteria will overwhelm the body’s natural
defenses  and  will then be too strong to suffer defeat at the hands of
therapeutic medicine.
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